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I study random-matching economies where ￿at money coexists with real assets and no restrictions are
imposed on payment arrangements. I investigate the relationship between assets￿intrinsic characteristics
and liquidity, and I analyze how monetary policy a⁄ects payment arrangements, asset prices, and welfare.
In accordance with the ￿nance literature, I emphasize private information frictions to explain why some
assets are more costly or more di¢ cult to trade than others. A key assumption of the theory is that agents
have a privileged knowledge of the fundamental value of the assets they hold in their portfolios. For instance,
an individual is better informed about the future dividend of a stock he owns, the value of a project he has
undertaken, or his ability to repay his debt.
Following the recent monetary literature pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), I consider an environ-
ment where some trades occur within bilateral meetings, and terms of trade are the outcome of a bargaining
game. Payment arrangements are therefore explicit and endogenous. A temporal double-coincidence-of-
wants problem makes the use of a medium of exchange necessary. There are two types of assets in the
economy: a ￿at object with no intrinsic value￿ ￿at currency￿ and a one-period-lived asset that promises some
output in the future. Both assets can be used as media of exchange.
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), there are periodic rounds of centralized and decentralized trades, assets
are perfectly divisible, and individuals￿portfolios are unrestricted. The presence of incomplete information
about the dividend of the real asset makes the determination of the terms of trade in bilateral meetings
a harder problem. I consider a simple bargaining game where buyers make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers, and I
sharpen the predictions of this game by appealing to the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).1
I study two versions of the model corresponding to di⁄erent structures for the asset market. In the ￿rst
version, real assets are not homogeneous (they generate dividends of di⁄erent sizes) and they can only be
traded in bilateral meetings. The asset is viewed as private equity or bilateral credit. In the second version,
the real asset, interpreted as a publicly traded stock, is homogenous but it is subject to aggregate dividend
shocks. It can be exchanged, and hence priced, both in centralized and decentralized markets.
For both versions of the model, ￿at money can be valued even though there are no restrictions on the
use of assets as media of exchange. The presence of informational asymmetries enlarges the set of parameter
1In Lagos and Wright (2005) the terms of trade in bilateral matches are determined by the Nash solution. Since standard
axiomatic bargaining solutions are not applicable to games with incomplete information, I adopt a strategic bargaining game￿ the
ultimatum game￿ which has been widely used in the search money literature.
2values under which ￿at money has a positive price. Fiat money is useful because in some states buyers spend
only a fraction of their asset holdings even though their consumption is ine¢ ciently low (in a sense to be
made precise later), i.e., the real asset is partially illiquid.
The model is used to analyze the relationship between asset liquidity￿ as measured by transaction velocity￿
and fundamentals. The asset becomes less liquid as the dispersion of the dividends across states increases.
Moreover, if the real asset is valueless in some states then it becomes fully illiquid. So, the model can
rationalize the exclusive use of ￿at currency as a medium of exchange.
The model has implications for asset prices. Provided that the stock of real assets is not too large and
in￿ ation is not too low, the price of the real asset can also rise above its expected dividend and exhibit a
liquidity premium. The imperfect substitutability between ￿at money and the real asset￿ buyers only spend
their real assets when their cash holdings are exhausted￿ manifests itself by a rate-of-return di⁄erential. The
illiquidity premium paid to the real asset tends to increase as the asset becomes riskier and more abundant.
Finally, the model delivers insights for the linkages between monetary policy and asset prices. Monetary
policy a⁄ects an asset￿ s return when the quantity of the real asset is not too large and in￿ ation is in some
intermediate range. An increase in in￿ ation induces a reallocation of individuals￿portfolios towards real
assets that are not as liquid as currency but have a higher rate of return. Consequently, the model predicts
a negative relationship between in￿ ation and assets￿expected returns. The optimal monetary policy is such
that the real asset in the high-dividend state is illiquid, i.e., its transaction velocity and liquidity premium
are zero.
1.1 Related literature
This paper aims at providing foundations for some of the trading restrictions found in recent search monetary
models with multiple assets. Aruoba and Wright (2003), Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007), Berentsen,
Menzio and Wright (2007) and Telyukova and Wright (2007) introduce capital, loans or stocks into the
Lagos-Wright model. Following Freeman (1985), they assume that all claims on future output can be
counterfeited at no cost, and hence they cannot be used as means of payment.2 Lagos (2006) introduces
￿Lucas trees￿but restricts their use as means of payment in a fraction of the trades (because of legal or
2Aruoba and Wright (2003) and Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007) also refer to the lack of portability of capital goods to
justify the assumption that capital cannot be used as means of payment in decentralized markets. They assume that agents
have their capital physically ￿xed in place at production sites. Telyukova and Wright (2007, Section 4) lay down an extension
of their model with "Lucas trees," in which agents pay a ￿xed cost if they use their real assets as means of payment.
3institutional reasons).3 Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2007) endogenize this fraction of trades by assuming
that agents have to invest in a costly technology to verify the authenticity of the assets held by other agents.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) introduce a similar trading restriction in a dynamic general equilibrium model
with two assets (capital and land). They assume that investing agents can sell at most a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1)
of their capital. In their footnote 6, they provide some explanations for why capital may not be perfectly
liquid: ￿there may be di⁄erent qualities of capital, and buyers may be less informed than sellers so that there
is adverse selection in the second-hand market.￿This is precisely the avenue I follow in this paper.4
In contrast to the literature above, the extent to which capital is used as means of payment is endogenous
and it depends on policy and the characteristics of the asset. The theory can justify the complete illiquidity
of capital, as in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007), if capital is valueless in some states. Relative to Kiyotaki
and Moore (2005) and Lagos (2006), my model links the illiquidity of capital to the properties of its dividend
process and to policy.
The idea of explaining asset liquidity by a private information problem is omnipresent in both the ￿nance
and the monetary literature. Asymmetries of informations are used to explain transaction costs in ￿nancial
markets (e.g., Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), security design (e.g., DeMarzo and Du¢ e, 1999),
and capital structure choices (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984). The monetary literature has resorted to private
information problems to explain the role of money when goods are of unknown quality (e.g., Williamson and
Wright, 1994; Banarjee and Maskin, 1996) or when individuals have private information about their ability
to repay their debt (e.g., Jafarey and Rupert, 2001).5 Closer to my model, Velde, Weber and Wright (1999)
explain Gresham￿ s law with an adverse selection problem in a search environment with a ￿xed supply of
indivisible coins of di⁄erent qualities.6
In accordance with Wallace￿ s (1996) dictum, I make no restriction on the use of assets as means of
payment. In the same vein, Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996), Wallace (1996, 2000) and Cone (2005)
emphasize asset divisibility, or lack of divisibility, to explain the coexistence of money and interest-bearing
assets and the liquidity structure of asset yields. Zhu and Wallace (2007) make bonds illiquid by constructing
3See Shi (2004) for a similar assumption in a search model with ￿at money and nominal bonds.
4Similarly, Zhu (2006, Section 4) discusses how one could introduce capital into his OLG model with search, and he argues
that to maintain the transactions role of money, "one could assume some private information about the quality of capital,
similar to the private information problem on the quality of goods in Williamson and Wright (1994)."
5Berentsen and Rocheteau (2004) introduce a moral hazard similar to Williamson and Wright (1994) into a model with
divisible money. The "counterfeit" consumption good is perishable, it has no value, and only a pooling mechanism is considered.
6Li (1995) constructs a related model, in which there is quality uncertainty about commodity monies.
4a pairwise-e¢ cient trading mechanism that yields a surplus to the buyer that is equal to the one he would
obtain if he would trade with money only (the ￿cash-in-advance￿twist) and had all the bargaining power. In
contrast to Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996), Shi (2004) and Zhu and Wallace (2007), this paper is not
an attempt to explain the coexistence of ￿at money and risk-free government bonds. (One could substitute
currency by risk-free bonds, like in Lagos (2006).)
Finally, Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) and Geromichalos, Licari and Suarez-Lledo (2007) study a complete
information version of the model in this paper. Money is useful provided that the capital stock in the
economy is small, and if money and capital coexist they have the same rate of return. In contrast, in my
model the presence of money is always useful irrespective of the size of the capital stock, and if money and
capital coexist then capital dominates money in its rate of return.
2 Environment
Time is discrete, starts at t = 0, and continues forever. Each period has two subperiods, a morning (AM)
followed by an afternoon (PM), where di⁄erent activities take place. There is a continuum of agents divided
into two types, called buyers and sellers, who di⁄er in terms of when they produce and consume. The labels
buyers and sellers indicate agents￿roles in the PM market. There are two consumption goods, one produced
in the AM and the other in the PM. Consumption goods are perishable.
Agents live for three subperiods. Buyers and sellers from generation t are born at the beginning of period
t, and they die at the end of the AM in period t + 1. (See Figure 1.) Let Bt denote the set of buyers from
generation t, St the set of sellers from generation t, and Jt = Bt [ St.7 The measures of buyers and sellers
are normalized to 1.
Generation t
Generation t+1
Figure 1: Overlapping generations structure
7This overlapping-generations structure facilitates the presentation of the model. For a related environment, see Zhu (2006)
and Zhu and Wallace (2007). The assumption of alternating market structures is borrowed from Lagos and Wright (2005).
5Buyers produce in the ￿rst AM of their lives while sellers produce in the PM. This heterogeneity will
generate a temporal double-coincidence problem.8 The utility of a buyer born at date t is
Ub
t = ￿‘t + u(qt) + ￿xt+1; (1)
where xt is the AM consumption of period t, ‘t is the AM disutility of work, qt is the PM consumption,
and ￿ 2 (0;1) is a discount factor. The utility function u(q) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, u(0) = 0,
u0(0) = 1, u0(q) > 0, and u00(q) < 0. The production technology in the AM is linear with labor as the only
input, yt = ‘t. Buyers￿endowment of labor is unlimited when young.
The utility of a seller born at date t is
Us
t = ￿c(qt) + ￿xt+1; (2)
where qt is the PM production. The cost function c(q) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, c(0) = c0(0) = 0,
c0(q) > 0, c00(q) ￿ 0 and c(q) = u(q) for some q > 0. Let q￿ denote the solution to u0(q￿) = c0(q￿).
At the beginning of his life, each buyer is endowed with A > 0 units of a one-period-lived real asset. The
asset is perfectly divisible, uncounterfeitable, and perfectly durable over its lifetime. Each unit of the asset
held by buyer j 2 Bt yields ￿j;t+1 units of AM-output delivered in t+1, and it fully depreciates subsequently.
The real dividend can take two values, ￿j;t+1 2 f￿‘;￿hg, where 0 < ￿‘ < ￿h. Let Bh
t ￿ fj 2 Bt : ￿j;t+1 = ￿hg
denote the subset of buyers from generation t endowed with high-dividend assets, and B‘
t ￿ BtnBh
t the subset
of buyers endowed with low-dividend assets.
I will consider two versions of the model, which di⁄er in terms of the description of the dividend shock
￿. In the ￿rst version, the ￿j;t￿ s are the realizations of i.i.d. random variables. In this case, the measures
of Bh
t and B‘
t are constant over time and equal to ￿h 2 (0;1) and ￿‘ = 1 ￿ ￿h, respectively. In the second
version, ￿j;t is independent of j and it is interpreted as an aggregate shock. Then, Bh
t = Bt with probability
￿h 2 (0;1) and Bh
t = ? with complement probability ￿‘ = 1 ￿ ￿h. Denote ￿ ￿ = ￿h￿h + ￿‘￿‘. For both
versions of the model, buyers who enter the PM have some private information about the quality of their
real asset holdings, while sellers are uninformed.
Fiat money is durable, perfectly divisible, and it can be held in any nonnegative amount. The quantity
of money per buyer in the PM of period t is denoted Mt. It grows at a constant gross rate, ￿ ￿ Mt+1=Mt,
8The description of the temporal double coincidence problem comes from Rocheteau and Wright (2005). The assumption
that sellers cannot produce when young is relaxed in Appendix F without a⁄ecting the results.
6where ￿ > ￿. New money is injected, or withdrawn if ￿ < 1, by lump-sum transfers Tt = (￿ ￿ 1)Mt￿1, or
taxes if ￿ < 1, to the young buyers.9
In the AM, there is a competitive market where agents can trade goods and ￿at money. I will make
di⁄erent assumptions about whether the real asset can be traded or not in the AM. No other assets (such
as bonds) are available in this market.
In the PM, each seller is matched bilaterally with a buyer drawn at random from Bt.10 All trades in
the PM are quid pro quo, and matched agents can transfer any nonnegative quantity of PM-output and any
quantity of their asset holdings. Agents can only trade the physical asset and not claims on future output.11
In order to guarantee that there is an essential role for a medium of exchange, there is no public record of
individuals￿trading histories.12
Terms of trade in the PM are determined according to a simple bargaining game: The buyer makes an
o⁄er that the seller accepts or rejects. If the o⁄er is accepted then the trade is implemented. At the end of
the PM, agent pairs split apart.
3 Social optimum
Consider the problem of a social planner who chooses an allocation in order to maximize the sum of utilities
of all agents in the economy. The planner assigns the Pareto-weights ￿
t to all agents from generation t, i.e.,
it values equally the consumption of one unit of AM-good and the disutility cost to produce one such unit
by any agent alive in period t.13
Let Mt ￿ Bt ￿St denote the set of bilateral matches composed of one buyer and one seller in the PM of






















fu[qt(j)] ￿ c[qt(j0)]gd(j;j0): (3)
9If ￿ < 1 the government can force all young buyers to pay taxes in the AM. However, it has no enforcement power in
the PM, and it does not observe agents￿trading histories. In a related model, Andolfatto (2007) considers the case where
the government has limited coercion power￿ it cannot con￿scate output and cannot force agents to work￿ and the payment of
lump-sum taxes is voluntary: agents can avoid paying taxes by not accumulating money balances. He shows that if agents are
su¢ ciently impatient, then the Friedman rule is not incentive-feasible, i.e., there is an induced lower bound on de￿ation.
10It would be easy to introduce search frictions so that the measure of bilateral matches in the PM is less than one, as is
standard in search monetary literature.
11See footnote 22 for an interpretation of the real asset as bilateral credit.
12If trading histories were publicly observable, then some good allocations could be implemented through the threat of trigger
strategies. See Kocherlakota (1998) for a detailed presentation of this argument.
13The choice of the welfare metric can be justi￿ed by the (observational) equivalence between the in￿nitely-lived-agent model
of Lagos and Wright (2005) and the OLG model with search and risk-neutral old of Zhu (2006). Waller (2007) shows that the
same optimal PM allocations would be derived under alternative weights for the welfare function.
7The ￿rst integral on the right-hand side of (3) corresponds to the AM-consumption of all old agents from
t = 1 onwards. The second term is the AM disutility of production of the young buyers from t = 0 onwards.
The last term is buyers￿consumption net of sellers￿disutility of production in bilateral matches formed in
the PM subperiods.
The planner observes the realizations of the dividend shocks f￿j;tg at the beginning of period t. It is









￿j;tdj; 8t ￿ 1 (4)
qt(j) ￿ qt(j0); 8(j;j0) 2 Mt; 8t ￿ 0: (5)
Feasibility constraint (4) requires agents￿AM-consumption in period t to be at most equal to the aggregate
production in that period, including the output generated by the stock of assets, A. Feasibility condition
(5) indicates that the buyer￿ s consumption in a bilateral match is no greater than the seller￿ s production in
that match.











fu[qt(j)] ￿ c[qt(j0)]gd(j;j0) (6)
subject to (4) and (5). The planner is indi⁄erent on how to allocate the AM-goods between agents. The
optimal consumption and production in bilateral matches satisfy qt(j) = qt(j0) = q￿ for all (j;j0) 2 Mt.
4 Payments under private information
In this section, I consider an economy without ￿at money, where only real assets can be used as media of
exchange. There is no market in the AM: all trades occur in bilateral meetings in the PM. This version of
the model is consistent with the dividend shock being idiosyncratic or aggregate.
This section has two purposes. One is to investigate how private information a⁄ects the capacity of
an asset to serve as a means of payment, thereby providing a benchmark to compare with the monetary
economies studied later. The second purpose is to analyze in detail the bargaining game under incomplete
information in a simple environment.
The bargaining game between a buyer and a seller in the PM has the structure of a signaling game.14 A
14See Appendix B for a more detailed presentation of signaling games. If one rescales the buyer￿ s payo⁄ as u(q)=￿ ￿ d and
the seller￿ s payo⁄ as ￿c(q)=￿ + d, then the bargaining game has the basic take-it-or-leave-it set-up de￿ned in Kreps and Sobel
(1994, p. 855).
8strategy for the buyer speci￿es an o⁄er (q;d) 2 R+ ￿[0;A], where q is the output produced by the seller and
d is the transfer of asset by the buyer, as a function of the buyer￿ s type (i.e., the future dividend of his asset
holdings). A strategy for the seller is an acceptance rule that speci￿es the set A ￿ R+ ￿[0;A] of acceptable
o⁄ers.
The buyer￿ s payo⁄ is [u(q) ￿ ￿￿d]IA(q;d)+￿￿A, where IA(q;d) is an indicator function that is equal to
one if (q;d) 2 A. If an o⁄er is accepted, then the buyer enjoys his utility of consumption in the PM, u(q),
net of the utility he forgoes by transferring d units of his asset to the seller, ￿￿￿d. The seller￿ s payo⁄ is
￿c(q) + ￿￿d. The seller uses the information conveyed by (q;d) to update his prior belief about the quality
of the asset held by the buyer. Let ￿(q;p) 2 [0;1] represent the updated belief of a seller that the buyer
holds a high-dividend asset (￿ = ￿h).
An equilibrium of the bargaining game is a pro￿le of strategies for the buyer and the seller, and a belief
system ￿. The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium. The buyer chooses an o⁄er that maximizes his
surplus, taking as given the acceptance rule of the seller. The seller chooses optimally to reject or accept
o⁄ers given his posterior belief. If (q;p) corresponds to an equilibrium o⁄er, then ￿(q;p) is derived from the
seller￿ s prior belief according to Bayes￿ s rule. If (q;p) is an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er, then the seller￿ s belief is
arbitrary (to some extent discussed later).
For a given belief system, the set of acceptable o⁄ers for a seller is
A(￿) = f(q;d) 2 R+ ￿ [0;A] : ￿c(q) + ￿ f￿(q;d)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d)]￿‘gd ￿ 0g: (7)
For an o⁄er to be acceptable, the seller￿ s disutility of production in the PM, ￿c(q), must be compensated
by his expected discounted utility in the next AM, ￿E￿ [￿]d, where the expectation is with respect to the
random dividend of the asset. I assume that a seller agrees to any o⁄er that makes him indi⁄erent between
accepting or rejecting a trade.15 The problem of a buyer holding an asset of quality ￿ is then
max
q;d￿A
[u(q) ￿ ￿￿d]IA(q;d): (8)
Sellers￿beliefs following out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers are largely arbitrary. The equilibrium concept is re￿ned
by using the Intuitive Criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987).16 Denote Ub
h the surplus of an h￿type
15A similar tie-breaking assumption is used in Rubinstein (1985, Assumption B-3).
16The Intuitive Criterion is a re￿nement supported by much of the signalling literature. An equilibrium that fails the
Intuitive Criterion gives an outcome that is not strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Also, Inderst
(2002) provides a strategic foundation of the selection procedure underlying the Intuitive Criterion in a search environment with
9buyer and Ub
‘ the surplus of an ‘￿type buyer in a proposed equilibrium of the bargaining game. This
proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if there is an unsent o⁄er (~ q; ~ d) such that the following is
true:
u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿h ~ d > Ub
h (9)
u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿‘ ~ d < Ub
‘ (10)
￿c(~ q) + ￿￿h ~ d ￿ 0: (11)
According to (9), the unsent o⁄er (~ q; ~ d) would make an h￿type buyer strictly better o⁄ if it were accepted.
According to (10), the unsent o⁄er (~ q; ~ d) would make an ‘￿type buyer strictly worse o⁄. According to (11),
the o⁄er is acceptable provided that the seller believes it comes from an h￿type.17
I next turn to the de￿nition of an equilibrium. Time is not introduced explicitly in the de￿nition since
there is no state variable linking the di⁄erent generations. Moreover, the seller￿ s acceptance rule is not
included; it appears as a constraint in the buyer￿ s problem.
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium is a list of strategies for buyers and a belief system for sellers, h[q(j);d(j)]j2B‘[Bh;￿i,
such that: (i) [q(j);d(j)] is solution to (8) with ￿ = ￿‘ for all j 2 B‘ and ￿ = ￿h for all j 2 Bh; (ii)
￿ : R+ ￿ [0;A] ! [0;1] satis￿es Bayes￿rule whenever possible and the Intuitive Criterion.
Buyers of the same type are allowed to use di⁄erent (pure) strategies. All sellers are assumed to use the
same belief system ￿, and hence the same acceptance rule. An equilibrium o⁄er (q;d) is de￿ned as pooling if
it is in the support of the distribution of o⁄ers made by both h￿type and ‘￿type buyers, i.e., ￿(q;d) 2 (0;1).
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, there is no pooling o⁄er.
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the argument in the proof of Lemma 1. Consider an equilibrium
with a pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d). The surpluses of the two types of buyers at the proposed equilibrium are denoted
Ub
‘ ￿ u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿‘ ￿ d and Ub
h ￿ u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h ￿ d. The indi⁄erence curves Ub
‘ and Ub
h in Figure 2 represent the
endogenous participation. See Riley (2001) for a survey of the applications of the Intuitive Criterion (and other re￿nements)
in various contexts. It has been used in monetary theory by Nosal and Wallace (2007) and Dutu, Nosal and Rocheteau
(2006); in the corporate ￿nance literature by Noe (1989) and DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999); in bargaining theory by Rubinstein
(1985, Assumption B-1); and recently in the literature on global games by Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006). For sake
of completeness, the model is also analyzed under the alternative re￿nement from Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1993) in Appendix C.
17The inequality in (11) is weak as a result of the tie-breaking rule (7) according to which sellers accept o⁄ers that make
them indi⁄erent between accepting and rejecting.
10set of o⁄ers (q;d) that generate the equilibrium surpluses. They exhibit a single-crossing property, which is
key to obtain a separating equilibrium.18 The participation constraint of a seller who believes he is facing
an h￿type buyer is represented by the frontier Us
h ￿ f(q;d) : ￿c(q) + ￿￿hd = 0g. The o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d) is located
above Us
h since it is accepted when ￿ < 1. The shaded area indicates the set of o⁄ers that raise the utility
of an h￿type buyer (o⁄ers to the right of Ub
h) but reduce the utility of an ‘￿type buyer (o⁄ers to the left of
Ub
‘) and that are acceptable by sellers, provided that ￿ = 1 (o⁄ers above Us
h). These o⁄ers satisfy (9)-(11)
so that the proposed equilibrium with a pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d) violates the Intuitive Criterion. In order to
separate himself, an h￿type buyer reduces his PM consumption as well as his transfer of his asset to the
seller. Provided that the reduction in q is su¢ ciently large relative to the reduction in d, an ‘￿type buyer


















Pooling  equilibrium Separating  equilibrium
Offers  violating  the  Intuitive  Criterion
l d
Acceptable  offers
Offers  attributed  to  L-type  buyers
Figure 2: Pooling vs separating equilibria
I now characterize the equilibrium o⁄ers. The only way an ‘￿type buyer can achieve a higher payo⁄
than the one he would get in a game with complete information is by making an o⁄er that a seller would
attribute to an h￿type buyer with positive probability, i.e., ￿(q;d) > 0, which has been ruled out by Lemma
1. Hence, since the complete information payo⁄ can always been achieved, i.e., ￿(q;d) ￿ 0, the o⁄er of an

























[u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘d] s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿￿‘d ￿ 0: (12)
I characterize next the o⁄er (qh;dh) made by an h￿type buyer. From the Intuitive Criterion, an h￿type
buyer can always increase his payo⁄ as long as by so doing he does not give incentives to an ‘￿type buyer
to imitate him. Hence, (qh;dh) solves:
U(￿h) = max
q;d￿A
[u(q) ￿ ￿￿hd] s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿￿hd ￿ 0 (13)
s.t. u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘d ￿ U(￿‘): (14)
From (13)-(14) the buyer maximizes his expected surplus subject to the participation constraint of the
seller, where the seller has the correct belief that he faces an h￿type buyer, and subject to the incentive-
compatibility condition according to which an ‘￿type buyer cannot be made better-o⁄by o⁄ering (qh;dh).19























Furthermore, dh < d‘ and qh < q‘ ￿ q￿.
If the quantity of asset is large enough, then the trade in ‘￿type matches is e¢ cient, q = q￿. In contrast,
if the value of the asset is less than the disutility incurred by the seller to produce q￿, then the ‘￿type buyer
cannot ask for the e¢ cient quantity of output. In both cases, the buyer appropriates the whole surplus of
the match.
19Suppose there is a separating equilibrium where the expected payo⁄ of the ‘￿type is U(￿‘) and the expected payo⁄ of the
h￿type is ^ U(￿h) 2 [0;U(￿h)). Replace U(￿‘) in (14) by U(￿‘)￿" with " > 0, and denote U"(￿h) the associated payo⁄ for the
h￿type buyer. The set of acceptable and feasible o⁄ers is compact. From the Theorem of the Maximum, U"(￿h) is continuous
in " and lim"!0 U"(￿h) = U(￿h). Hence, there is an " > 0 such that U"(￿h) > ^ U(￿h). The associated o⁄er satis￿es (9)-(11)
so that the proposed equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion.
12Equation (17) determines a unique qh < q‘. Given qh, dh is determined by (18). The most noticeable
feature of this solution is that qh < q‘, which implies dh < A and qh < q￿. Buyers holding high-dividend
assets only trade a fraction of their assets in the PM market even though their consumption is ine¢ ciently
low. This illiquidity￿ the fact that they spend strictly less than they would in a complete information
environment￿ is a consequence of the need for buyers in the high state to separate themselves from buyers
in the low state.
Buyers￿o⁄ers are illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2 (in the case where the constraint d‘ ￿ A
does not bind). The o⁄er of the ‘￿type buyer is at the tangency point between the iso-surplus curve of
the seller, Us
‘ ￿ ￿c(q) + ￿￿‘d = 0, and the iso-surplus curve of the buyer, Ub
‘. In order to satisfy the
seller￿ s participation constraint and (14), type￿h buyers make o⁄ers to the left of Ub
‘ and above Us
h. The
utility-maximizing o⁄er is at the intersection of the two curves.
A belief system consistent with the o⁄ers in Proposition 1 is such that sellers attribute all o⁄ers that
violate (14) to ‘￿type buyers, and all other out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers to h￿type buyers. (See the right panel
of Figure 2.) So, larger trades that involve the transfer of a large quantity of an asset su⁄er from less
favorable terms of trade.
I now turn to the normative properties of the equilibrium. If ￿‘A ￿ c(q￿)=￿, then the value of the
low-dividend asset is large enough to trade the ￿rst-best quantity, q￿. Under complete information the
economy achieves its ￿rst-best. In contrast, if the quality of the asset is private information, then the
equilibrium allocation is ine¢ cient. The ‘￿type buyers consume q￿, but h￿type buyers consume qh < q￿. If
￿‘A < c(q￿)=￿, then the quantities traded in the PM are ine¢ ciently low in all matches, i.e., qh < q‘ < q￿.20
5 Fiat money and payment arrangements
In this section ￿at money is introduced as a competing means of payment. I ask whether ￿at money can
acquire some positive value in exchange, and whether it helps mitigate the ine¢ ciencies associated with
the adverse selection problem in the PM and the partial illiquidity of the real asset. I study how the
rate of return of ￿at currency a⁄ects asset liquidity and payment arrangements. Finally, the model will
20One could also ask whether there exists an incentive-feasible trading mechanism that implements the ￿rst-best allocation in
the absence of ￿at money. Consider a direct mechanism that maps the buyer￿ s type ￿ into an o⁄er (q;d). Suppose qh = q‘ = q￿.
Then, incentive-compatibility requires dh = d‘ = d. So the outcome is pooling, in contrast to the outcome of our bargaining
game. The trade (q￿;d) satis￿es the seller￿ s individual rationality constraint if ￿c(q￿)+￿￿ ￿d ￿ 0. Similarly, buyers are willing to
participate if u(q￿) ￿ ￿￿hd ￿ 0. Thus, the ￿rst-best is incentive-feasible provided that A ￿ c(q￿)=￿￿ ￿ and ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ u(q￿)=c(q￿),
i.e., there is no shortage of the asset and the discrepancy between the dividends in the di⁄erent states is not too large.
13provide microfoundations, and closed-form expressions, for some of the trading restrictions found in the
recent monetary literature.
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Figure 3: Game tree
I depart from the previous section by opening a competitive market in the AM where agents can trade
￿at money for goods. The dividend shocks, ￿j;t, are independent and identically distributed across buyers,
i.e., the measures of the subsets Bh
t and B‘
t are time-invariant.21 The real asset, which is not homogenous, is
only traded in bilateral meetings in the PM. (In the next section, the asset be traded in the AM market in
order to investigate implications for asset prices.) One can think of the asset as private equity or bilateral
credit (IOUs).22
The sequence of events is summarized by the game tree in Figure 3. First, for every buyer, Nature chooses
the dividend size ￿ 2 f￿‘;￿hg. A buyer learns the future dividend of his asset holdings before trading in
the AM market. Second, the buyer chooses his real balances as a function of his type. Third, he enters a
bilateral match in the PM, and he makes an o⁄er to an uninformed seller, who accepts or rejects it. From
the seller￿ s standpoint, the buyer j he is matched with has been chosen at random from the pool of all
21Sellers cannot pool the risk associated with the random quality of the asset they receive in the PM. For instance, they
learn the quality of the asset as soon as they leave the PM, before they can trade with each other.
22Many assets, such as corporate bonds, private equity, derivatives and swaps, are traded in bilateral meetings, in over-the-
counter markets. See Du¢ e, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) for a formalization of such markets using a search model. A version
of the model with IOUs would adopt a similar interpretation as in Jafarey and Rupert (2001). Buyers receive an endowment A
in the last period of their lives with probability ￿ 2 (0;1) and nothing with the complement probability 1 ￿ ￿. Hence, buyers
default with probability 1￿￿, and the expected value of a claim of d units of future output is ￿d. For such credit arrangements











= ￿‘. The buyer￿ s portfolio is assumed to be non-observable
by the seller in the match, and hence it cannot be used to condition the seller￿ s acceptance decision (i.e., all
histories with the same o⁄er are part of the same information set).23
Denote pt the price of the AM-good in period t. I focus on steady-state equilibria where aggregate real
balances, Mt=pt, are constant over time. Then, pt+1=pt = ￿.
A buyer makes two decisions consecutively: his real balances in the AM and the o⁄er to make in the PM.
Hence, the strategy of a buyer is de￿ned as a list (z;q;d;￿) function of his type ￿, where z is the choice of
real balances (expressed in terms of the AM good of the current period), q is the buyer￿ s consumption in the
PM, d the transfer of the real asset, and ￿ the transfer of real balances. The optimal strategy maximizes the










s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿ f￿(q;d;￿)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿‘gd +
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 0: (20)
The unspent real balances of the buyer generate a ￿ ow of utility, ￿(z ￿ ￿)=￿, because consumption takes
place in the next AM and real balances depreciate at rate ￿.24 Since buyers￿real balances are not observable,
the seller￿ s updated belief, ￿, only depends on the o⁄er made by the buyer, (q;d;￿).
Lemma 2 Any buyer￿ s strategy, (z;q;d;￿), such that z > ￿, is strictly dominated.
Since it is costly to hold money￿ the gross in￿ ation rate is larger than the discount factor￿ and since
real balances have no signaling function, it is a dominant strategy for a buyer to bring the exact amount he
plans to spend in a bilateral match.
From Lemma 2, buyers￿strategies can be restricted to triples (q;d;!), where ! ￿ ￿z=￿ = ￿￿=￿ indicates
both the real balances of the buyer (discounted and expressed in terms of the next period￿ s AM good) and
the real money transfer in the PM to the seller. The buyer￿ s problem, (19)-(20), can then be reduced to:
max
q;d￿A;!
f￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿dg s.t. ￿ c(q) + f￿(q;d;!)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;!)]￿‘gd + ! ￿ 0; (21)
where ￿(q;d;!) is the seller￿ s posterior belief (with a slight abuse of notation), and i ￿ (￿ ￿￿)=￿ > 0 is the
cost of holding real balances.
23This assumption simpli￿es the presentation by reducing the extent to which the buyer can signal his type. In Section 6 I
consider a model with a di⁄erent information structure where buyers￿portfolios are common knowledge in the match.
24Suppose the buyer hands over mt units of money to the seller. These mt units of money buy mt=pt+1 units of AM goods
in period t + 1 or, equivalently, (mt=pt)(pt=pt+1) = (mt=pt)=￿.
15De￿nition 2 An equilibrium is a list of buyers￿strategies and a belief system for sellers, h[q(j);d(j);!(j)]j2B;￿i,
such that: (i) [q(j);d(j);!(j)] is solution to (21) with ￿ = ￿‘ for all j 2 B‘ and ￿ = ￿h for all j 2 Bh; (ii)
￿ : R+ ￿ [0;A] ￿ R+ ! [0;1] satis￿es Bayes￿ s rule whenever possible and the Intuitive Criterion.
Using a similar argument to the one in Lemma 1, the next proposition establishes that the equilibrium
is separating.
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium, there is no pooling o⁄er.
From Lemma 3, an ‘￿type buyer cannot do better than his complete-information payo⁄, which solves
U(￿‘) = max
q;d￿A;!￿0
f￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘dg s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿￿‘d + ! ￿ 0: (22)
If c(q￿) ￿ ￿￿‘A, then q‘ = q￿, d‘ = c(q￿)=￿￿‘, and ! = 0. If c(q￿) > ￿￿‘A, then d‘ = A, !‘ =
[c(q‘) ￿ ￿￿‘A]
+ (where [x]+ ￿ max(x;0)) and q‘ solves
u0(q‘)
c0(q‘)
￿ 1 + i; (23)
with a strict equality if !‘ > 0. So ‘￿type buyers accumulate real balances if the value of their real asset is
not large enough to purchase q￿ and if i is su¢ ciently small.
As in the previous section, the Intuitive Criterion selects the equilibrium that is Pareto e¢ cient (from
the standpoint of buyers￿interim payo⁄s) in the class of separating equilibria.25 Hence, the h￿type buyer
makes an o⁄er that maximizes his payo⁄ subject to the seller￿ s acceptance rule and the condition that the
o⁄er must not be imitated by ‘￿type buyers, i.e., (qh;dh;!h) solves
max
q;d￿A;!
f￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿hdg (24)
s.t. ! ￿ c(q) + ￿￿hd ￿ 0 (25)
￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘d ￿ U(￿‘): (26)









(1 + i)￿h ￿ ￿‘
(27)
dh =
U(￿‘) ￿ [u(qh) ￿ (1 + i)c(qh)]
[(1 + i)￿h ￿ ￿‘]￿
(28)
25See footnote 19 for a formal argument.
16and
u0 (qh) ￿ (1 + i)c0(qh) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if !h > 0: (29)
Assuming !h > 0, the problem of an h￿type buyer can be solved recursively. First, (29) determines qh.
Given qh, (27) and (28) determine !h and dh.26
The next proposition determines the conditions for ￿at money to be valued in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Existence of monetary equilibrium)
There exists i1 ￿ 0 and i2 > i1, such that the following is true.
1. If i < i1, then there is a unique monetary equilibrium, and it is such that all buyers accumulate real
balances. Furthermore, i1 > 0 i⁄ ￿‘A < c(q￿)=￿.
2. If i 2 [i1;i2), then there is a unique monetary equilibrium, and it is such that only h￿type buyers
accumulate real balances.
3. If i ￿ i2, then there is no equilibrium where ￿at money is valued.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 4. The condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium in
part 1 of Proposition 2 is identical to the one in the complete-information economy. Indeed, with complete
information ￿at money is valued if and only if !‘ > 0 (since !h < !‘) or, equivalently,








. The condition (30) requires A to be small enough.
Part 2 of Proposition 2 is new. If i > i1, then there is no monetary equilibrium with complete information.
In contrast, if buyers have some private information, then a monetary equilibrium exists, provided that i is
not greater than i2 ￿
u
0(^ q)
c0(^ q) ￿1, where ^ q < q￿ is the solution to (17). The threshold i2 is bounded away from
zero, for any level of the stock of assets, A. In particular, if A ￿ c(q￿)=￿￿‘, then U(￿‘) = u(q￿) ￿ c(q￿), so
that both ^ q < q￿ and i2 > 0 are independent of A. So the private information problem enlarges the set of
parameter values under which ￿at money is valued.
26A belief system that is consistent with (22) and (24)-(26) is ￿(qh;dh;!h) = 1, ￿(q‘;d‘;!‘) = 0 and, for out-of-equilibrium
o⁄ers,
￿(q;d;!) = 0 8(q;d;!) s.t. ￿ (1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘d > U(￿‘)
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Figure 4: Existence of a monetary equilibrium
A distinctive feature of search-theoretic monetary models is their ability to endogenize payment arrange-
ments in decentralized trades (e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). The next proposition describes the payment
arrangements in the PM and asset liquidity as a function of fundamentals. Liquidity is measured by the
fraction of the stock of the asset that is used as means of payment in the PM. Such transaction velocities
are denoted by Vh ￿ dh=A and V‘ ￿ d‘=A.
Proposition 3 (Payments, liquidity, and fundamentals)
1. In all monetary equilibria, !h > !‘ ￿ 0, dh < d‘ ￿ A; qh < q￿ and q‘ 2 [qh;q￿].
2. dVh=d￿h < 0 and dVh=d￿‘ > 0.
3. dV‘=d￿h = 0; dV‘=d￿‘ < 0 if c(q￿) < ￿￿‘A and V‘ = 1 otherwise.






= 1 + i.
According to part 1 of Proposition 3, the high-dividend asset is partially illiquid in the sense that buyers
only spend a fraction of their assets, dh < A, even though their PM consumption is ine¢ ciently low, qh < q￿.
As a consequence of this illiquidity, h￿type buyers accumulate more real balances than ‘￿type buyers. By
holding onto a fraction of his real asset, the buyer is able to signal its quality to the seller; he uses the liquid
18asset to ￿nance the rest of his consumption.27 Notice that this payment pattern is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from the one that would prevail in the complete-information economy: h￿type buyers would accumulate
fewer real balances and consume (weakly) more than ‘￿type buyers.
According to part 2, the velocity of the high-dividend asset increases with the size of the low-state
dividend, ￿‘, and it decreases with ￿h. To understand this result, notice from (26) that ‘￿type buyers enjoy
an informational rent equal to ￿(￿h￿￿‘)dh. As ￿‘ gets closer to ￿h, this informational rent shrinks, and the
incentive-compatibility constraint of the ‘￿type buyer is relaxed, which improves the liquidity of the asset
in the high-dividend state.28 Conversely, as ￿h ￿ ￿‘ increases, the informational asymmetries become more
severe, which makes the incentive-compatibiliy condition more binding. According to part 3, the velocity of
the low-dividend asset decreases with ￿‘ but it is una⁄ected by ￿h.
In the case where the dividend in the low state approaches 0 (part 4 of Proposition 3), the adverse
selection problem is so severe that the real asset ceases to be traded. Fiat money becomes the only means
of payment.29 This result rationalizes cash-in-advance-like constraints.




(1 + i)￿h ￿ ￿‘
: (31)
This expression makes a connection between this model and the approaches of Kiyotaki and Moore (2005)
and Lagos (2006). In Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), agents can only sell a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of their illiquid
asset (capital) to raise funds; in Lagos (2006), agents can use their illiquid asset ("Lucas￿trees") in a fraction
of ￿ of the matches. In both cases, the parameter ￿ is exogenous.30 In my model, assuming i < i1, buyers
spend all their capital in a fraction ￿‘ of the matches, and they spend a fraction i￿‘
(1+i)￿h￿￿‘ of their capital in
the remaining ￿h matches. The illiquidity of capital is endogenous: it depends on the intrinsic characteristics
27This result is reminiscent to some of the ￿ndings of the liquidity-based model of security design from DeMarzo and Du¢ e
(1999). They consider the problem faced by a ￿rm that needs to raise funds by issuing a security backed by real assets. The
issuer has private information regarding the distribution of cash ￿ows of the underlying assets. Using the Intuitive Criterion,
they show that a signaling equilibrium exists in which the seller receives a high price for the security by retaining some fraction
of the issue.
28This result is related to the ￿ndings in Banerjee and Maskin (1996), according to which the good that serves as the medium
of exchange is the one for which the discrepancy between qualities is smallest.
29Strictly speaking, the ‘￿type buyers use the real asset in payments (d‘ = A) but because ￿‘ ! 0 the amount of output
they buy with it approaches 0. This result is related to the threat of counterfeiting in Nosal and Wallace (2007).
30If I assume the same trading restriction as in Kiyotaki-Moore in a version of the model with homogenous assets (￿h =
￿‘ = ￿) then q = q￿ i⁄ ￿A ￿ c(q￿)=￿￿ in which case ￿at money is not valued and the velocity of capital is V = c(q￿)=￿￿A. If
￿A < c(q￿)=￿￿ then V = ￿. If I assume the same restriction as in Lagos then the following is true. If A ￿ c(q￿)=￿￿ then q = q￿
in a fraction ￿ of the trades and V = ￿c(q￿)=￿￿A. If A < c(q￿)=￿￿ then V = ￿.
19of the asset (￿‘ and ￿h) as well as monetary policy (i).
In the case where i 2 (i1;i2) then, from (28), asset velocity satis￿es
Vh =
u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘) ￿ maxq [u(q) ￿ (1 + i)c(q)]
[(1 + i)￿h ￿ ￿‘]￿A
; (32)
where q‘ = min
￿
c￿1(￿￿‘A);q￿￿
. The fraction of the real asset that is used as means of payment is still a
function of the dividend process and in￿ ation, but it is no longer independent of the stock of the asset: it
decreases with A provided that A is su¢ ciently large.
The next Proposition investigates the e⁄ects of monetary policy on payment arrangements and liquidity.
Proposition 4 (Monetary policy and liquidity)
1. If i < i2 then d!h=di < 0, dVh=di > 0 and dV‘=di = 0.
2. In addition, if i < i1 then d!‘=di < 0.
3. As i ! 0, Vh ! 0 and q ! q￿ in all trades.
In￿ ation lowers the rate of return of ￿at money, and hence it induces buyers to reduce their real balances.
While the liquidity of the low-dividend asset is independent of monetary policy, in￿ ation raises the velocity
of the high-dividend asset. Since !h > !‘ an increase in i makes it less attractive for an ‘￿type buyer to
imitate an h￿type buyer. For instance, in the case where i < i1, the incentive-compatibility condition (26)
at equality yields ￿dh (￿h ￿ ￿‘) = i(!h ￿ !‘). An increase in i relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint
allowing the h￿type buyer to transfer a larger quantity of his real asset in the PM.
As the cost of holding money is driven to 0, the equilibrium allocation approaches the ￿rst best.31 The
optimal monetary policy is such that the high-dividend asset is illiquid, i.e., h￿type buyers trade with money
only. Moreover, if ￿￿‘A > c(q￿) then ‘￿type buyers do not accumulate real balances. So, buyers specialize
in di⁄erent means of payment according to their types.32
31Recall that even if the Friedman rule is optimal, it might not be incentive-feasible if the government has limited coercion
power. See footnote 9.
32While ￿at money and the real asset coexist as means of payment in equilibrium for all i > 0, there is an equilibrium at
i = 0 where d‘ = 0 and !‘ = c(q￿) so that only money is used. To see this, notice from (22) that at i = 0 the choices of ! and
d are perfect substitutes for ‘￿type buyers: they only care about the total expected resources they give up, ￿￿‘d + !. Hence,
the equilibrium allocation is only upper-hemi continuous at i = 0.
206 Asset pricing and liquidity
This section investigates the implications of the model for asset prices. I analyze the relationship between
assets intrinsic characteristics, liquidity, and returns. The model also provides a channel through which
monetary policy a⁄ects asset prices.
The model is amended as follows. The real asset is described as a short-lived homogenous "Lucas tree"
subject to an aggregate dividend shock. All capital goods yield a high dividend (i.e., ￿j;t = ￿h for all j)
with probability ￿h, and a low dividend (i.e., ￿j;t = ￿‘ for all j) with complement probability ￿‘. Both ￿at
money and capital are traded in a competitive market in the AM.33 This extension allows the real asset to
be priced. In order to prevent the asset price from revealing buyers￿private information, it is assumed that
buyers learn the future dividend of the real asset when they enter the PM, after they chose their portfolios.
Finally, to simplify the analysis of the bargaining game, a buyer￿ s portfolio is common knowledge in a match
in the PM.34
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Figure 5: Game tree
The sequence of events is summarized by the game tree of Figure 5. First, newborn buyers make a
portfolio choice in the AM market. Second, they receive a private and fully informative signal about the
33As indicated in Section 2, money and capital are the only assets that are traded in the competitive market in the AM. It
is shown in the Appendix A6 that even if sellers could produce when young they would have no strict incentives to accumulate
capital or hold real balances.
34If buyers￿porfolios were private information then one would have to specify the seller￿ s belief regarding the portfolio of the
buyer in the match, which would open the possibility of multiple equilibria.
21future dividend of the real asset. Then, they enter the PM and get matched with sellers. An implication
of this timing is that the buyer￿ s portfolio does not convey any information about ￿. Upon entering the
bargaining game, and irrespective of the buyer￿ s portfolio he observes, the seller assigns probability ￿h to
the event ￿ = ￿h and probability ￿‘ to the event ￿ = ￿‘. Once the buyer has made his o⁄er (q;d;￿), the
seller updates his initial belief. Let ￿(q;d;￿;!;a) denote the seller￿ s belief that ￿ = ￿h conditional on the
o⁄er (q;d;￿) being made. The seller￿ s posterior belief, ￿, is also a function of the buyer￿ s portfolio (which is
known to the seller). In the following, this dependence will be left implicit.
The strategy of a buyer is composed of a portfolio choice (!;a) in the AM and an o⁄er (q;d;￿) in the










s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿(q;d;￿)￿￿hd + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿￿‘d +
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 0 (34)
￿
￿
￿ ￿ !; d ￿ a: (35)
Let de￿ne the buyer￿ s surplus in the PM as Sj (!;a) ￿ u(q)￿￿￿jd￿￿￿=￿ for j 2 f‘;hg where (q;d;￿) is a
solution to (33)-(35) when the buyer￿ s state is (!;a;￿j).
In the AM, buyers choose their portfolios in order to maximize their expected surplus in the PM net of




￿i! ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)a + ￿hSh(!;a) + ￿‘S‘(!;a)
￿
; (36)
where i = (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿ is the cost of holding real balances, and ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ is the cost of investing in capital, the
di⁄erence between its price and its expected discounted dividend. Since sellers cannot produce in the AM,
only buyers hold some capital and market-clearing implies
Z
j2B
a(j)dj = A: (37)
De￿nition 3 An equilibrium is a list of portfolios, buyers￿strategies in the PM, the price of capital, and a
belief system for sellers, h[!(j);a(j)]j2B;[q(￿;j);d(￿;j);￿(￿;j)]j2B;￿,￿i such that: (i) [!(j);a(j)] is solution
to (36) for all j 2 B; (ii) [q(!;a;￿;j);d(!;a;￿;j);￿(!;a;￿;j)] is solution to (33)-(35) for all j 2 B and for
all (!;a;￿); (iii) ￿ satis￿es Bayes￿rule whenever possible and the Intuitive Criterion. (iv) ￿ solves (37).
22The next lemmas characterize the equilibrium o⁄ers in the PM. The Intuitive Criterion is applied in
every subgame following a portfolio choice (!;a) by a buyer.
Lemma 5 Consider a buyer in the PM with ! units of real balances and a units of capital. If ￿ = ￿‘ then










s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿￿‘d +
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 0 (39)
￿
￿
￿ ￿ !; d ￿ a: (40)










s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿￿hd +
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 0 (42)
u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘d ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ S‘(!;a) (43)
￿
￿
￿ ￿ !; d ￿ a: (44)
The equilibrium of the bargaining game is separating. In the low-dividend state, buyers make their






￿￿‘ = c(q‘). The buyers￿surplus
in this case is S‘(!;a) = ^ S (! + ￿￿‘a), which only depends on their total wealth. In the high-dividend state,
buyers choose the separating o⁄er that maximizes their surplus. Pooling o⁄ers are ruled-out by a reasoning
analogous to the one in the previous sections: if there were a pooling o⁄er then buyers could deviate in the
high-dividend state and signal the true state of the world by demanding less output and o⁄ering less capital.
Lemma 6 For any (!;a) 2 R2
+, there is a unique solution (qh;dh;￿h) to (41)-(44) and it is such that (42)
and (43) hold at equality.
1. If ! ￿ c(q￿) then





dh = 0: (47)
232. If ! < c(q￿) then ￿h = ￿!=￿ and (qh;dh) 2 [0;q‘] ￿ [0;a] is solution to:
￿￿hdh = c(qh) ￿ ! (48)






[c(qh) ￿ !] = u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘); (49)
where q‘ = min
￿
q￿;c￿1 (! + ￿￿‘a)
￿
. Moreover, if a > 0 then qh < q‘ and dh < a.
Lemma 6 o⁄ers a pecking order theory of payment choices: agents with a consumption opportunity
￿nance it with cash ￿rst, and they use their risky assets as a last resort.35 They choose not to spend all their
capital goods, even when qh is ine¢ ciently low, in order to signal the high future dividend of the real asset.
From (48) and (49), the fraction ￿h ￿ dh=a of his capital that a buyer spends in the PM is a function of
his portfolio, (!;a), as well as the characteristics of the dividend process, (￿‘;￿h). For instance, ￿h decreases
with ! and ￿h, but it increases with ￿‘. The fact that ￿h is a⁄ected by real balances o⁄ers a channel through
which monetary policy a⁄ects the liquidity of the real asset. At the margin, the fraction of capital that is







If a > c(q￿)=￿￿‘ then q‘ = q￿ and ddh=da = 0. A marginal unit of capital has no direct liquidity value in
the high-dividend state; it in￿ uences the terms of trade only indirectly, through the surplus of the buyer in
the low-dividend state, by relaxing the incentive-compatibility constraint. But if a > c(q￿)=￿￿‘ then the
liquidity needs in the low-dividend state are satiated, and hence an additional unit of capital does not a⁄ect
the terms of trade in the high-dividend state.
Let S￿
! and S￿
a denote the partial derivatives of the surplus function S￿(!;a) for ￿ 2 f‘;hg. These
quantities represent the liquidity values of ￿at money and capital in the state ￿. It is shown in the Appendix










A marginal unit of asset (expressed in terms of its discounted value in the next AM market) allows the buyer
to purchase 1=c0(q‘) units of PM output, which is valued according to the marginal surplus of the match,
35The term ￿pecking order￿was coined by Myers (1984, p.581). It describes the predictions of models of capital structure
choices under private information. According to the pecking order theory, ￿rms with an investment opportunity prefer internal
￿nance (nondistributed dividends). If external ￿nance is required then they issue the safest security ￿rst, and they use equity
as a last resort.

























Consider a buyer who accumulates an additional unit of capital. How does this marginal unit impact on
his surplus in the PM in the high-dividend state? Provided that q‘ < q￿, an additional unit of capital raises
the surplus of the buyer in the low-dividend state by S‘
a, and hence it relaxes the incentive-compatibility
constraint (43). Suppose the buyer increases his consumption by dqh and delivers ddh units of capital in
exchange. In order to make the trade acceptable by sellers, ddh = c0(qh)dqh=￿￿h. A buyer in the low-
dividend state who imitates this o⁄er can extract an informational rent equal to ￿(￿h ￿ ￿‘)ddh, i.e., his
surplus increases by [u0(qh) ￿ ￿‘
￿hc0(qh)]dqh. Therefore, the buyer in the high-dividend state can only a⁄ord
to consume dqh solution to [u0(qh)￿ ￿‘
￿hc0(qh)]dqh = S‘
a, and his utility increases by Sh
a = [u0(qh) ￿ c0(qh)]dqh,
which gives (53).
It can be seen from (51) and (53) that Sh
a < S‘
a (unless q‘ = q￿) so that the capital stock has a lower




















So, the expected liquidity value of capital, expressed as a fraction of its fundamental price, is less than the
liquidity value of ￿at currency. This observation will be useful in the following to explain the rate of return
di⁄erential between assets.
Given the solution to the bargaining problem in the PM, I proceed backward and solve the buyer￿ s
portfolio problem in the AM.
Lemma 7 If ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ then there is a unique solution to (36) and it satis￿es
￿i + ￿hSh
!(!;a) + ￿‘S‘
!(!;a) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if ! > 0. (54)
￿￿ + ￿￿ ￿ + ￿hSh
a(!;a) + ￿‘S‘
a(!;a) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if a > 0. (55)
If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ then ! is uniquely determined by (54) and a 2 [
c(q
￿)￿!
￿￿‘ ;1). If ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ then there is no solution
to (36).
25If the price of capital is greater than its fundamental value, i.e., ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ > 0, then the composition of
the buyer￿ s optimal portfolio is unique. This result is a consequence of Lemma 6 according to which ￿at
money is a preferred means of payment, i.e., the two assets are not perfect substitutes. If the price of capital
coincides with its fundamental value, ￿ = ￿￿ ￿, then buyers hold enough wealth to buy the ￿rst-best quantity
of output when ￿ = ￿‘ and the buyer￿ s choice of capital is indeterminate. In contrast, the choice of real
balances is always unique.
The next proposition proves existence of the equilibrium and it characterizes the allocations.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium allocations and prices)
An equilibrium exists and it is such that the price of capital, ￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿;￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘], and the allocation
(!;q‘;qh;dh;￿h) are uniquely determined. For all A > 0, there is a i0(A) > 0 such that the equilibrium is
monetary if and only if i < i0(A).
From (51), (53) and (55), the equilibrium price of capital satis￿es

















The second term on the right-hand side of (56) is the liquidity component of the asset price. It is positive
if and only if q‘ < q￿ and ￿‘ > 0. If q‘ = q￿ then buyers have enough wealth to buy q￿ in the low-dividend
state so that a marginal unit of capital is not useful as a means of payment. If ￿‘ ! 0 then capital has no
value in the low-dividend state, and hence it does not provide liquidity in the PM. From (54), the liquidity




















According to the right-hand side of (57) ￿at money provides some liquidity services whenever q‘ < q￿ or
qh < q￿.
A monetary equilibrium exists for all A provided that the cost of holding real balances, i, is su¢ ciently
low. This result contrasts with the complete-information economy where the equilibrium is monetary only
if the capital stock is not large enough to allow buyers to trade q￿ when ￿ = ￿‘ (See Appendix E). Money is
useful, even for large values of A, because it overcomes the illiquidity of capital in the high-dividend state,
i.e., it relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint faced by buyers. Consequently, the set of parameter
values under which ! > 0 is larger in the economy with private information (see Figure 6).
26The next proposition describes the e⁄ects of monetary policy on the liquidity and expected return of
the real asset. The liquidity of capital is measured by its transaction velocity, and its liquidity premium is
de￿ned by L = (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿.36 The expected return of capital is Ra = ￿ ￿=￿.
Proposition 6 (Monetary policy, liquidity, and returns.)
1. If i < i0(A) then dVh=di > 0.
2. For all i > 0, there is ￿ A(i) 2 [0;c(q￿)=￿￿‘] such that:
(a) For all A ￿ ￿ A(i), L = 0 and Ra = ￿
￿1.
(b) For all A < ￿ A(i), L > 0 and Ra < ￿
￿1. Moreover, if i < i0(A) then dL=di > 0 and dRa=di < 0.
3. As i ! 0, Vh ! 0, L ! 0 and Ra ! ￿
￿1.
The price of capital can depart from its fundamental value and exhibit a liquidity premium. This
liquidity component emerges if capital is relatively scarce, i.e., A < c(q￿)=￿￿‘, and in￿ ation is su¢ ciently
large, i > ￿ A￿1(A). On the contrary, if in￿ ation is too low then the liquidity needs in the low-dividend state
are exhausted.37 An obvious requirement for monetary policy to be e⁄ective is that ￿at money is valued,
which necessitates that in￿ ation is not too large, i < i0(A).
An increase in the in￿ ation rate raises the price of capital, and its liquidity premium, through a substitu-
tion e⁄ect that induces buyers to hold fewer real balances but more capital. Since capital is in ￿xed supply,
its price goes up and the fraction of capital that is used as means of payment in the high-dividend state (Vh)
increases. As a corollary of these ￿ndings, the model predicts a negative relationship between in￿ ation and
expected asset returns.38
If capital is su¢ ciently abundant to allow buyers to consume q￿ in the low-dividend state then the price
of capital is equal to its fundamental value￿ which is independent of monetary policy￿ and its expected rate
of return is equal to the gross discount rate.
36Since the payment arrangement in the low-dividend state is indeterminate when ￿ = ￿￿ ￿, I focus on the velocity in the
high-dividend state. The velocity of the asset in the low-yield state is equal to 1 if A < ￿ A(i). In the case where A > ￿ A(i),
one could adopt the convention that buyers use their money ￿rst, i.e., V‘ = [c(q￿) ￿ !]=￿￿‘A and dV‘=di > 0 provided that
i < i0(A).
37The expression for ￿ A(i) is provided in the proof of Proposition 6. If i < i0(A), i.e., ￿at money is valued, it can be shown
that ￿ A(i) is strictly increasing.
38The negative relationship between equity returns and in￿ation has been extensively documented. See Marshall (1992)
for references. Theoretical models of this relationship are provided by Danthine and Donaldson (1986) and Marshall (1992).
Both models assume the liquidity services of ￿at money through a money-in-the-utility-function assumption or a shopping time
technology.
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Figure 6: Types of equilibria: Liquidity premium and value of money
The optimal policy drives the cost of holding money to 0, and it exhausts the liquidity of the real asset.
As i tends to zero then q‘ and qh approach q￿.39 In the high-dividend state, buyers trade with money only
(dh ! 0) while in the low-dividend state buyers are indi⁄erent between using money or capital as means of
payment. The price of capital converges to its fundamental value (￿ ! ￿￿ ￿).
Next, I look at the implications of the model for the rates of return of ￿at money (Rm = ￿￿1) and capital
(Ra = ￿ ￿=￿).
Proposition 7 (Rate of return dominance)
In any monetary equilibrium, Ra > Rm.
The expected rate of return of capital is always greater than the rate of return of ￿at money (provided that
it is valued). So, the model generates a rate-of-return di⁄erential between the two assets without resorting
to restrictions on payment arrangements. This rate-of-return di⁄erential is not an obvious consequence of
the di⁄erence of risks associated with each asset. Indeed, because of linear preferences with respect to AM
consumption, the riskiness of capital would not a⁄ect its rate of return if it were not used as a means of
payment in the PM. For instance, if A is su¢ ciently abundant then capital has no liquidity value at the
39Since the equilibrium correspondence is only upper-hemi continuous at i = 0, I focus on the equilibria that are obtained by
taking the limit as i approaches 0. Moreover, it is worth recalling that the Friedman rule might not be feasible if one assumes
limited coercion power by the government. See footnote 9. Also, the Friedman rule may not longer be optimal if agents have
strictly concave preferences and face idiosyncratic trading shocks. See Zhu (2006) and Waller (2007).
28margin and Ra = ￿
￿1, independently of the dividend process. Risk matters here because, in the presence of
private information, it a⁄ects the liquidity value of capital relative to the one of ￿at money.
As showed in the Appendix E, such rate-of-return dominance pattern can also emerge from an economy
with complete information. The private information problem, however, reduces the liquidity premium that
accrues to the real asset, and it increases the rate of return di⁄erential between ￿at money and risky capital.
In particular, the liquidity premium of capital, (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿, is bounded above by ￿‘i=￿ ￿, which tends to zero
as the dividend in the low state becomes small. Moreover, provided that the capital stock is su¢ ciently large
(A > ￿ A(i)), the rate of return of capital is maximum and equal to the gross discount rate, Ra = ￿
￿1. In
this case, an additional unit of capital has no liquidity value in the PM.40
The rate of return di⁄erential between risk-free ￿at money and risky capital depends on the relative
liquidity of both assets, which in turn depends on their intrinsic characteristics, such as their rate of return
and risk. I end this section by illustrating this point through a simple numerical example. I adopt the
following speci￿cations: u(q) = 2
p
q, c(q) = q, ￿ = 0:95, ￿‘ = 1 ￿ ￿, ￿h = 1 + ￿, ￿h = ￿‘ = 0:5 and A = 1.
The mean of the dividend is equal to 1 while its variance is ￿2. I consider the e⁄ects of a change in ￿ on the
velocity of the asset and its liquidity premium.
Figure 7: Asset liquidity
40These results can have interesting empirical implications for asset pricing puzzles (provided that one reinterprets currency
as risk-free bonds). Indeed, Lagos (2006) showed that a standard search model of exchange can generate an equity premium as
large as in the data (for plausible degrees of risk aversion) provided that equity is partially illiquid. While the illiquidity arises
from legal or institutional restrictions in Lagos (2006), it is directly related to the dividend process here.
29The left panel of Figure 7 represents the velocity of the asset in the high state, Vh = dh=A. (Recall that
in the low state the payment can be indeterminate.) As ￿ increases, the fraction of the asset that is used as
means of payment in the high-dividend state decreases. As ￿ approaches one, the real asset becomes fully
illiquid.
The right panel of Figure 7 plots the liquidity premium de￿ned as
￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ = 1￿￿Ra. Recall that the rate
of return of ￿at money is constant and equal to ￿￿1. Hence, as the liquidity premium decreases the rate-of-
return di⁄erential increases. The relationship between the liquidity premium and risk is nonmonotonic. An
increase in ￿ makes the asset more illiquid in the high-dividend state so that the liquidity premium should
fall. But the decrease in ￿‘ makes liquidity more valuable in the low-dividend state. As ￿ is su¢ ciently
large, the liquidity premium decreases with risk, and it tends to 0 as ￿ approaches one. So, the rate-of-return
di⁄erential is maximum provided that the real asset is su¢ ciently risky.
7 Conclusion
I have formalized economies where ￿at money coexists and competes with a one-period lived real asset as
means of payment. I complied with the Wallace (1996) dictum by placing no restrictions on the use of assets
as media of exchange. The usefulness of ￿at money in the model arises from a private information problem
about the fundamental value of real assets. Some agents are informed about the future dividend of capital
goods while others are uninformed. These informational asymmetries make real assets partially illiquid
thereby providing microfoundations for some of the trading restrictions, or liquidity constraints, found in the
recent monetary literature. I have investigated the relationship between asset liquidity and fundamentals,
the implications for asset pricing, and the links between monetary policy, liquidity and asset returns.
In order to obtain a unique outcome for the bargaining game, the notion of sequential equilibrium
has been re￿ned using the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). While the Intuitive Criterion is
widely accepted in the literature on signaling games (see footnote 16), alternative approaches can o⁄er a
complementary view of the game. In Appendix C it is shown that the equilibrium selected by the Intuitive
Criterion is undefeated (in the sense of Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1993) if the probability of
the high-dividend state is su¢ ciently small or if in￿ ation is not too large (i < ￿h=￿ ￿￿1). This result provides
some con￿dence that the results are not overly sensitive to the equilibrium re￿nement.
In terms of extensions, one could investigate the e⁄ect of liquidity on capital formation by letting the
30real asset be produced in the AM (as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006)). The dividend shocks can be made
persistent to study liquidity and asset prices over the cycle. For some questions (e.g., endogenous information
acquisition) it might also be desirable to endow sellers with some market power (e.g., through competitive
price posting). Finally, it would certainly be worthwhile to calibrate a version of the model in order to
see how well it does to explain some asset pricing puzzles, as in Lagos (2006), or to quantify the e⁄ects of
monetary policy on capital accumulation and output, as in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007).
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35A. Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose there is an equilibrium o⁄er such that ￿(￿ q; ￿ d) 2 (0;1). Hence, Ub
h =
u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h ￿ d and Ub





[u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘d] s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿￿‘d ￿ 0.
Since ￿‘ > 0, Ub
‘ > 0 and hence ￿ q > 0. Furthermore, (￿ q; ￿ d) is accepted by sellers if
￿c(￿ q) + ￿
￿
￿(￿ q; ￿ d)￿h +
￿
1 ￿ ￿(￿ q; ￿ d)
￿
￿‘
￿ ￿ d ￿ 0:
To show that the proposed equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion, consider an out-of-equilibrium
o⁄er (~ q; ~ d) such that ~ d = ￿ d ￿ ", where " 2
￿
0; ￿ d ￿ c(￿ q)=￿￿h
￿
, and ~ q < ￿ q satis￿es (9)-(10) or, equivalently,
u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h" < u(~ q) < u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿‘": (58)
Since ￿(￿ q; ￿ d) < 1, c(￿ q) < ￿￿h ￿ d and
￿
0; ￿ d ￿ c(￿ q)=￿￿h
￿
is not empty. Moreover, Ub
h ￿ 0 implies u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h" ￿
￿￿h
￿￿ d ￿ "
￿
. For any " 2
￿
0; ￿ d ￿ c(￿ q)=￿￿h
￿
, ￿ d ￿ " > 0 and there is a ~ q ￿ 0 that satis￿es (58).
From (58), (~ q; ~ d) satis￿es (9)-(10). Moreover, " < ￿ d ￿ c(￿ q)=￿￿h implies c(￿ q) < ￿￿h
￿￿ d ￿ "
￿
. From (58),
u(￿ q) ￿ u(~ q) > 0 and therefore c(￿ q) ￿ c(~ q) > 0. So (11) is satis￿ed as well.
Proof of Proposition 1. The allocation in ‘￿type matches, (15) and (16), is derived directly from
(12). The rest of the proof focuses on the allocation in h￿type matches. It proceeds in three parts. First,
I establish that both the seller￿ s participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility condition (14) are
binding. Second, it is shown that the solution to (13)-(14) is unique and it is such that dh < d‘ and qh < q‘.
Third, I specify a belief system ￿ consistent with these o⁄ers.
(i) The set of admissible values for (q;d) being compact (closed and bounded) and the buyer￿ s objective
function being continuous, a solution to (13)-(14) exists. It is straightforward to check that this solution can-
not be such that neither the seller￿ s participation constraint nor (14) bind. Suppose ￿rst that the seller￿ s par-
ticipation constraint binds while (14) is slack. Then, qh = min
￿
c￿1(￿￿hA);q￿￿
￿ q‘ = min
￿
c￿1(￿￿‘A);q￿￿
(from (15)) and dh = c(qh)=￿￿h. Thus,
u(qh) ￿ ￿￿‘dh = u(qh) ￿
￿‘
￿h
c(qh) > u(qh) ￿ c(qh):
36Since qh ￿ q‘ then u(qh) ￿ ￿￿‘dh > u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘) = U(￿‘) and (14) is violated. A contradiction.
Suppose next that (14) binds while the seller￿ s participation constraint is slack. Substitute u(qh) by its
expression given by (14) into the h￿buyer￿ s objective function to get
U(￿h) = max
d￿A
(￿‘ ￿ ￿h)￿d + U(￿‘)
which yields dh = 0 and U(￿h) = u(qh) = U(￿‘). So the seller￿ s participation constraint, ￿c(qh) + ￿￿hdh =
￿c(qh) < 0, is violated. A contradiction.
Consequently, the solution to (13)-(14) is such that both the seller￿ s participation constraint and (14)
bind. Substitute dh = c(qh)=￿￿h into (14) to get (17)-(18).




fU(￿‘) ￿ [u(qh) ￿ c(qh)]g: (59)
The term between brackets on the right-hand side of (59) is strictly decreasing from U(￿‘) to 0 as qh varies
from 0 to q‘ ￿ q￿, while the left-hand side of (59) is strictly increasing from 0 to c(q‘) as qh varies from 0 to
q‘. Hence, there is a unique qh 2 (0;q‘) that solves (59) and it is the unique solution to (13)-(14). To see
this, from (17),







Hence, the solution to (17) corresponding to the lowest value for qh is the one that maximizes the h￿type
buyer￿ s payo⁄, u(qh) ￿ c(qh).
Finally, from the fact that h￿buyers prefer weakly (qh;dh) to (q‘;d‘) and ‘￿buyers prefer weakly (q‘;d‘)
to (qh;dh),
￿￿‘(d‘ ￿ dh) ￿ u(q‘) ￿ u(qh) ￿ ￿￿h(d‘ ￿ dh): (60)
Since q‘ > qh then dh < d‘.
(iii) A belief system consistent with the o⁄ers (q‘;d‘) and (qh;dh) is as follows. Bayes￿rule requires
￿(q‘;d‘) = 0 and ￿(qh;dh) = 1. For all other (out-of-equilibrium) o⁄ers,
￿(q;d) = 0 if u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘d > U(￿‘)
￿(q;d) = 1 otherwise.
One can verify that (q‘;d‘) and (qh;dh) are solutions to (8) given ￿(q;d). Any o⁄er such that u(q)￿￿￿‘d >
U(￿‘) is assigned to an ‘￿type buyer and it is such that ￿c(q) + ￿￿‘d < 0 (by de￿nition of U(￿‘)). Hence
37it is rejected by sellers. Consequently, U(￿‘) is the highest payo⁄ attainable by an ‘￿type buyer. Similarly,
the solution to (13)-(14) is also the solution to (8) since any o⁄er that violates (14) is rejected by sellers and
any o⁄er that satis￿es (14), except (q‘;d‘), is attributed to an h￿type buyer.
Proof of Lemma 2. A buyer￿ s strategy is de￿ned as his choice of real balances, z, and the subsequent
o⁄er in the PM, (q;d;￿). Consider two strategies s= (z;q;d;￿) such that ￿ < z and s0 = (￿;q;d;￿). The
two strategies prescribe the same o⁄er in the PM but di⁄er in terms of the choice of real balances. The
seller￿ s strategy is an acceptance set A such that (q;d;￿) is accepted if it is an element of A. The strategy s0
strictly dominates s if it generates a strictly higher payo⁄ irrespective of the seller￿ s acceptance set, A. Let
IA denote the indicator function that is equal to one if its argument is in A. The buyer￿ s expected utility if




(￿ ￿ ￿) +
￿








(￿ ￿ ￿) +
￿






for any A (since ￿ < z). Hence, s is strictly dominated.
Proof of Lemma 3. A proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if there is an unsent o⁄er
(~ q; ~ d; ~ !) that satis￿es:
￿(1 + i)~ ! + u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿h ~ d > Ub
h (61)
￿(1 + i)~ ! + u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿‘ ~ d < Ub
‘ (62)
~ ! ￿ c(~ q) + ￿￿h ~ d ￿ 0 (63)
where Ub
h and Ub
‘ are the buyers￿equilibrium payo⁄s de￿ned as their expected surplus in the PM net of the
cost of holding real balances (but excluding the lump-sum transfer T). Suppose there is an equilibrium o⁄er
such that ￿(￿ q; ￿ d; ￿ !) 2 (0;1) with ￿ d > 0. Hence, buyers￿equilibrium payo⁄s are
Ub
h ￿ ￿(1 + i)￿ ! + u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h ￿ d
Ub
‘ ￿ ￿(1 + i)￿ ! + u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿‘ ￿ d:
This o⁄er satis￿es the seller￿ s participation constraint, i.e.,
￿c(￿ q) +
￿
￿(￿ q; ￿ d; ￿ !)￿h +
￿




￿ ￿ d + ￿ ! ￿ 0: (64)
38In order to prove that the proposed equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion, consider an out-of-
equilibrium o⁄er (~ q; ~ d; ~ !) such that ~ ! = ￿ !, ~ d = ￿ d ￿ " where " 2
￿
0; ￿ d + [￿ ! ￿ c(￿ q)]=￿￿h
￿
\ (0; ￿ d], and it
satis￿es (61)-(62) or, equivalently,
u(￿ q) ￿ ￿"￿h < u(~ q) < u(￿ q) ￿ ￿"￿‘: (65)
Since ￿(￿ q; ￿ d; ￿ !) < 1, (64) implies c(￿ q) < ￿￿h ￿ d + ￿ ! and
￿
0; ￿ d + [￿ ! ￿ c(￿ q)]=￿￿h
￿
is non-empty. The re-
quirement Ub
h ￿ 0 implies u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h ￿ d ￿ 0 and hence u(￿ q) ￿ ￿"￿h ￿ ￿￿h
￿￿ d ￿ "
￿
￿ 0. So for any
" 2
￿
0; ￿ d + [￿ ! ￿ c(￿ q)]=￿￿h
￿
\ (0; ￿ d] there is a ~ q ￿ 0 satisfying (65). From (65), (~ q; ~ d; ~ !) satis￿es (61)-(62).
Moreover, c(￿ q) < ￿￿h
￿￿ d ￿ "
￿
+ ￿ !. From (65), u(￿ q) ￿ u(~ q) > 0 and hence c(￿ q) > c(~ q). So, (63) is also
satis￿ed.
Finally, to show that there is no pooling o⁄er with d = 0 it is enough to notice that
max
q;!￿0
f￿(1 + i)! + u(q)g s.t. ￿ c(q) + ! ￿ 0
is less than U(￿‘), the complete-information payo⁄ of the ‘￿type buyer de￿ned in (22).
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof proceeds in two parts. First, it establishes that the constraints (25)
and (26) are binding. Second, it proves that the solution to (24)-(26) exists and is unique.
(i) The constraints (25) and (26) are binding.
It is straightforward to show that the solution to (24)-(26) cannot be such that neither (25) nor (26)
bind. Assume that the seller￿ s participation constraint binds while (26) is slack. Then,
(qh;dh;!h) = max
q;d￿A;!￿0
f￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿hdg s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿￿hd + ! = 0:




with an equality if !h > 0. From the comparison with (22), it can be checked that qh ￿ q‘ and !h ￿ !‘
with at least one strict inequality. Hence,
￿i!h + u(qh) ￿ c(qh) > U(￿‘) = ￿i!‘ + u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘):
Since c(qh) = ￿￿hdh + !h the previous inequality gives
￿(1 + i)!h + u(qh) ￿ ￿￿‘dh > ￿i!h + u(qh) ￿ c(qh) > U(￿‘):
39So (26) is violated. A contradiction.
Assume next that (25) is slack while (26) binds. Substitute !h by its expression given by (26) into the




(￿‘ ￿ ￿h)￿dh + U(￿‘) = U(￿‘);
which yields dh = 0 and u(qh) ￿ (1 + i)!h = U(￿‘). The seller￿ s participation constraint, !h ￿ c(qh) ￿ 0,
can then be rewritten as
￿(1 + i)c(qh) + u(qh) ￿ U(￿‘):
Since d‘ > 0, it can be checked from (22) that maxq [￿(1 + i)c(q) + u(q)] < U(￿‘). Hence, there is no qh
that satis￿es the constraint above.
Consequently, the solution to (24)-(26) is such that both (25) and (26) bind.
(ii) The solution to (24)-(26) exists and is unique.
Assume !h > 0. One can solve for !h and dh from (25) and (26) and get (27)-(28). Substitute !h and
dh by their expressions given by (27) and (28) into (24) and di⁄erentiate with respect to qh to show that
qh = ~ q where ~ q is the unique solution to
u0 (~ q) ￿ (1 + i)c0(~ q) = 0:





c(~ q) > U(￿‘): (66)
If (66) does not hold then !h = 0. From Proposition 1, qh = ^ q 2 (0;q‘) is the unique solution to (17) and
dh = c(^ q)=￿￿h. Hence, (qh;dh;!h) solves (27)-(28) with !h = 0. The condition (66) is violated if ~ q ￿ ^ q or,
equivalently, u0 (^ q) ￿ (1 + i)c0(^ q) ￿ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
From Lemma 4 and Eq.(22) the terms of trade (q‘;d‘;!‘) and (qh;dh;!h) are uniquely determined.
Therefore, up to the seller￿ s belief system, the equilibrium is unique. The rest of the proof proceeds in two
steps.
(a) Condition under which !‘ > 0.








c0(qc) ￿ 1. Moreover, i1 > 0 i⁄
c￿1(￿￿‘A) < q￿.
(b) Condition under which !h > 0.
First, !h > 0 when i < i1. Indeed, if !h = 0 then qh < q‘ (from (17) and Proposition 1). Since
u
0(q‘)
c0(q‘) ￿ 1 = i then
u
0(qh)
c0(qh) ￿ 1 > i. A contradiction with (29). Second, if i ￿ i1 then !‘ = 0 (from (a)). From
the proof of Lemma 4, !h > 0 i⁄ i < i2 ￿
u
0(^ q)
c0(^ q) ￿ 1 where ^ q 2 (0;qc) is the unique solution to (17). Since
^ q < qc ￿ q￿ then i2 > i1 ￿ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Suppose there exists a monetary equilibrium such that !h = 0. From
Proposition 1, qh < q‘. The condition (29), u0(qh)=c0(qh) ￿ 1 + i, and the fact that qh < q‘ imply
u0(q‘)=c0(q‘) < 1 + i. Hence, from (23), !‘ = 0 and the equilibrium is nonmonetary. A contradiction.
So in any monetary equilibrium !h > 0 and, from (29), u0(qh)=c0(qh) = 1+i. From (23), u0(q‘)=c0(q‘) ￿ 1+i
and hence qh ￿ q‘ with an equality if !‘ > 0.
Next, I prove !h > !‘. This is immediate if !‘ = 0 (since !h > 0 in any monetary equilibrium). Consider
the case !‘ > 0. The incentive-compatibility condition for the ‘￿type buyer is
￿(1 + i)!‘ + u(q‘) ￿ ￿￿‘d‘ ￿ ￿(1 + i)!h + u(qh) ￿ ￿￿‘dh: (67)
Since c(q‘) = !‘ + ￿￿‘d‘ and c(qh) = !h + ￿￿hdh, (67) becomes
￿i!‘ + u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘) ￿ ￿i!h + u(qh) ￿ c(qh) + ￿ (￿h ￿ ￿‘)dh:
Since qh = q‘ when !‘ > 0, (67) becomes
i(!h ￿ !‘) ￿ ￿dh(￿h ￿ ￿‘):
The assumption ￿h > ￿‘ implies !h > !‘ since dh > 0. (To see that dh > 0 use (28) and the fact that
U(￿‘) > maxq [￿(1 + i)c(q) + u(q)]).
Finally, since c(qh) = !h + ￿￿hdh ￿ c(q‘) = !‘ + ￿￿‘d‘ and !h > !‘, ￿hdh < ￿‘d‘. Hence, dh < d‘.
(ii) If i ￿ i2 then !h = 0. From the proof of Proposition 1, qh is the unique solution less than q‘ to (59).














￿￿h [￿hu0(qh) ￿ ￿‘c0(qh)]
< 0;








From (18), dVh=d￿‘ > 0.
If i < i1 then
Vh ￿ dh=A =
i￿‘
(1 + i)￿h ￿ ￿‘
;
where I have used (28) and the fact that qh = q‘ and U(￿‘) = u(q‘) ￿ (1 + i)c(q‘) + i￿￿‘d‘. It is then
straightforward to show that dVh=d￿h < 0 and dVh=d￿‘ > 0. If i 2 (i1;i2) then !‘ = 0 and U0(￿‘) =




[u0(q‘)=c0(q‘) ￿ 1]A + dh






[(1 + i)￿h ￿ ￿‘]
< 0:
(iii) From (22), d‘ = A if c(q￿) ￿ ￿￿‘A. Hence, V‘ = 1. Otherwise, d‘ = c(q￿)=￿￿‘ and hence
dV‘=d￿‘ < 0.
(iv) From the proof of Proposition 2, i1 ! 1 as ￿‘ ! 0. Hence, there always exists a monetary
equilibrium. From (22), U(￿‘) ! maxq f￿ic(q) + [u(q) ￿ c(q)]g which from (28) yields dh ! 0. From
Proposition 2, i < i1 implies !h > 0 and !‘ > 0. From (23) and (29), both qh = c￿1(!h) and q‘ = c￿1(!‘)
satisfy u0(q)=c0(q) = 1 + i.
Proof of Proposition 4. Two cases are distinguished.
(a) !‘ > 0. From (23), dq‘=di < 0 and, using the fact that !‘ = c(q‘) ￿ ￿￿‘A, d!‘=di < 0. Rewrite (28)
as
dh =
U(￿‘) ￿ maxq [u(q) ￿ (1 + i)c(q)]
￿ [(1 + i)￿h ￿ ￿‘]
:





￿ [(1 + i)￿h ￿ ￿‘]
> 0;
42where I used the fact that !h = c(qh) ￿ ￿￿hdh and, from (22), dU(￿‘)=di = ￿!‘ = ￿[c(q‘) ￿ ￿￿‘A]. From
(29), dqh=di < 0. Since !h = c(qh) ￿ ￿￿hdh then d!h=di < 0.





￿ (i￿h + ￿h ￿ ￿‘)
> 0:
The rest of the proof is analogous to (a).
Finally, from (29), qh ! q￿ as i ! 0. From (28), dh ! 0 as i ! 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider the bargaining game between a buyer who has made the portfolio choice
(!;a) in the AM and a seller. Recall that the portfolio choice is common knowledge in the match. The
outcome of (33)-(34) cannot be pooling (or semi-pooling). Since the argument is analogous to the one in the
proof of Lemma 3, I only review it succinctly.
Suppose that the equilibrium of the bargaining game admits a pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿). By de￿nition,
￿ Sh (!;a) = u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h ￿ d ￿ ￿￿ ￿=￿ and ￿ S‘ (!;a) = u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿‘ ￿ d ￿ ￿￿ ￿=￿. This equilibrium fails the Intuitive
Criterion if there exists an unsent o⁄er (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) that it is feasible, ￿~ ￿=￿ ￿ ! and ~ d ￿ a, and such that
u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿h ~ d ￿
￿
￿
~ ￿ > ￿ Sh (!;a) (68)
u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿‘ ~ d ￿
￿
￿
~ ￿ < ￿ S‘ (!;a) (69)
￿c(~ q) + ￿￿h ~ d +
￿
￿
~ ￿ ￿ 0: (70)




￿c(￿ q)+￿￿h ￿ d+￿￿ ￿=￿
￿￿h
￿
\ (0; ￿ d], and
u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h" < u(~ q) < u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿‘":
First, such an o⁄er exists since ￿c(￿ q) + ￿￿h ￿ d + ￿￿ ￿=￿ > 0 (i.e., the pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) is acceptable).
Also, ￿ Sh ￿ 0 implies u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿h" ￿ ￿￿h(￿ d ￿ ") ￿ 0 so that for any " there is a ~ q ￿ 0 satisfying the above
inequality. Second, this o⁄er satis￿es (68)-(69). Moreover, the inequalities ￿c(￿ q) + ￿￿h(￿ d ￿ ") + ￿￿ ￿=￿ > 0
and c(￿ q) ￿ c(~ q) > 0 imply that (70) holds.
The outcome of the bargaining game being separating, a buyer with ￿ = ￿‘ cannot do better than his
complete-information payo⁄. Hence, (q;d;￿) is solution to (38)-(39). Let ~ Sh denote the payo⁄of a ￿h￿buyer
43with portfolio (!;a) as given by the solution to (41)-(43). Suppose there is an equilibrium where the payo⁄
of a ￿h￿buyer is ^ Sh. First, ^ Sh ￿ ~ Sh since otherwise either (42) or (43) is violated. If ^ Sh < ~ Sh then the
￿h￿buyer can deviate and propose the solution to (41)-(43) where the term S‘(!;a) on the right-hand side
of (43) is replaced by S‘(!;a)￿￿ for ￿ > 0. Provided that ￿ is su¢ ciently small this o⁄er satis￿es (68)-(70).
So the proposed equilibrium does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. Hence, ^ Sh = ~ Sh.
Proof of Lemma 6. The buyer￿ s objective function in (41) is continuous, and it is maximized over a
compact set. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum, there is a solution to (41)-(44). If a = 0 it can easily
be checked that (qh;￿h) = (q‘;￿‘). So, in the following I focus on the case where a > 0.





q‘ and dh > 0 if ! < c(q￿). Since c(qh) = ￿￿hdh + ￿￿h=￿ then (43) becomes
u(qh) ￿ c(qh) + ￿dh(￿h ￿ ￿‘) ￿ u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘):
Consequently, if ! < c(q￿) then (43) is violated, which is a contradiction. If ! ￿ c(q￿) then qh = q￿ and the
inequality above implies dh = 0 and ￿￿h=￿ = c(q￿).
Second, suppose that the seller￿ s participation constraint (42) is slack. Substitute u(qh) by its expression




(￿‘ ￿ ￿h)￿d + ^ S (! + ￿￿‘a)
i
= ^ S (! + ￿￿‘a);
and dh = 0. The h￿buyer gets the same surplus as a ‘￿buyer, i.e.,












where I have used that dh = 0 in the maximization problem on the right-hand side of the equality. The
equality holds if and only if ! ￿ c(q￿). In that case, qh = q￿ and ￿￿h=￿ = c(q￿), which is consistent with
the ￿rst case.
Third, suppose ! < c(q￿) so that both the seller￿ s participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility
condition (43) are binding. Since (42) is binding, dh is given by (48). Substitute dh by its expression into
(43) at equality to get (49). For all qh 2 [0;q‘] the left-hand side of (49) is strictly increasing. It is
nonpositive at qh = 0 and greater than u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘) at qh = q‘ provided that c(q‘) > !. From (38)-
(40) if ! < c(q￿) then c(q‘) = min[c(q￿);! + ￿￿‘a] > ! (since I focus on the case a > 0). Hence, there
44is a unique qh 2 (0;q‘) solution to (49). It can be checked that u(qh) ￿ c(qh) is decreasing in qh for
any solution to (49). (See Proposition 1 for a related argument.) Hence, the unique solution in (0;q‘)
delivers a maximum to the problem (41)-(44). Given a unique qh, dh is determined by (48). Finally,
c(qh) = !+￿￿hdh < c(q‘) = ￿￿‘=￿+￿￿‘d‘ implies dh < a. To see this, recall that ￿￿‘=￿+￿￿‘d‘ = !+￿￿‘a
if ! + ￿￿‘a ￿ c(q￿) and ￿￿‘=￿ + ￿￿‘d‘ = c(q￿) < ! + ￿￿‘a otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 7. Equations (54) and (55) are the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ! and a of
the problem (36). The following cases are distinguished: ￿ > ￿￿ ￿, ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ and ￿ < ￿￿ ￿.
(i) ￿ > ￿￿ ￿.
First, compute the ￿rst and second partial derivatives and the cross-partial derivatives of the functions
S‘(!;a) and Sh(!;a) where ! = ￿z=￿. These expressions will be used to prove that the objective function
in (36) is strictly concave with respect to (!;a) over some relevant range.






a = ￿￿‘ ^ S
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‘, S‘
! = ^ S
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= ￿￿‘ ^ S
0
‘;
where I have used the fact that u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘) = ^ S(! + ￿￿‘a). Notice that dqh
d! > 0 for all ! < c(q￿) and
dqh
da > 0 for all (!;a) such that ! + ￿￿‘a < c(q￿). From Lemma 6, the seller￿ s participation constraint (42)
holds at equality so that Sh(!;a) = u(qh) ￿ c(qh). Hence,
Sh













a(!;a) = [u0(qh) ￿ c0(qh)]
dqh
da































































For all ! < c(q￿), Sh
!! < 0. Consequently, the ￿rst leading principal minor of the Hessian matrix associated
with (36), ￿hSh
!! + ￿‘S‘
!!, is negative for all ! < c(q￿).
























































































































> 0; 8qh ￿ q￿:
Hence, jHj > 0 for all ! + ￿￿‘a < c(q￿).
One can now show that there is a unique solution to (36). First, the solution to (36) is such that
! +￿￿‘a ￿ c(q￿). Suppose ! +￿￿‘a > c(q￿). Then, ^ S
0
‘ = 0 and Sh
a(!;a) = S‘
a(!;a) = 0. But then the ￿rst-
order condition for a, (55), implies a = 0. If ! > c(q￿) then qh = q‘ = q￿ and hence Sh
!(!;a) = S‘
!(!;a) = 0.
46The ￿rst-order condition for !, (54), implies then ! = 0. A contradiction. So one can restrict (!;a) to the
compact set f(!;a) 2 R2+ : ! + ￿￿‘a ￿ c(q￿)g and, from the Theorem of the Maximum, a solution to (36)
exists and it satis￿es the ￿rst-order conditions (54)-(55). Since H is negative de￿nite for all (!;a) such that
! + ￿￿‘a < c(q￿), i.e., the leading principal minors of H alternate in sign with the ￿rst one being negative,
the solution to (36) is unique.
(ii) ￿ = ￿￿ ￿.
From the ￿rst-order condition for a, (55), Sh
a(!;a) = S‘
a(!;a) = 0, which requires !+￿￿‘a ￿ c(q￿). The







￿ 0; ￿ = ￿ if ! > 0. (71)
where I have used that ^ S
0
‘ = 0. From (49), qh is only a function of ! and it solves






[c(qh) ￿ !] = u(q￿) ￿ c(q￿): (72)
For all ! ￿ c(q￿), ￿(qh) = ￿(q￿) = 0 and (71) does not hold. Since ￿0 < 0 and dqh
d! > 0 for all ! 2 (0;c(q￿)),
and since the function on the left-hand side of (71) is continuous in !, there is a unique ! 2 [0;c(q￿)] solution




(iii) ￿ < ￿￿ ￿.
Since Sh
a(!;a) ￿ 0 and S‘
a(!;a) ￿ 0 there is no solution to the ￿rst-order condition for a.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, it establishes the existence and
uniqueness of the market-clearing price ￿. Second, it derives the condition for a monetary equilibrium.
Third, it characterizes the allocations in the PM.
(i) Existence and uniqueness of ￿.
De￿ne Ad(￿) ￿
nR
j2B a(j)dj : a(j) solution to (36)
o
. From Lemma 7, if ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ then there is a unique
solution (!;a) to the problem (36). Hence, Ad(￿) = fag. Moreover, since (!;a) can be restricted to the
compact set f(!;a) 2 R2+ : ! + ￿￿‘a ￿ c(q￿)g and since the objective function in (36) is continuous, the












47where H = [Hij](i;j)2f1;2g2 is the Hessian matrix associated with (36). Since jHj > 0 (see proof of Lemma















Consequently, for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿, da=d￿ = H11=jHj < 0 where H11 = ￿hSh
!! + ￿‘S‘
!!. If the solution to (36) is










So, Ad(￿) is decreasing provided that a > 0.
Next, I establish that Ad(￿) = f0g if ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘. To see this, rewrite (55) as
￿￿ + ￿￿ ￿
￿￿‘
+ ￿h￿(qh) ^ S
0
‘ + ￿‘ ^ S
0
‘ ￿ 0:
From the comparison with (54), if
￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿‘ > i then (55) holds with a strict inequality and a = 0. Moreover, it
can be checked from (54)-(55) that if Ad(￿) = f0g then Ad(￿
0) = f0g for all ￿
0 > ￿.






where ^ !(i) is the unique solution to (71)-(72). The equations (54)-
(55) being continuous in (!;a), lim￿!￿￿ ￿ !(￿) = ^ !(i) and lim￿!￿￿ ￿ [!(￿) + ￿￿‘a(￿)] = c(q￿). Consequently,
lim￿!￿￿ ￿ a(￿) =
c(q
￿)￿^ !(i)
￿￿‘ 2 Ad(￿￿ ￿).
To summarize: Ad(￿) is upper-hemi continuous, any selection from Ad(￿) is decreasing whenever a > 0,
Ad(￿) = f0g for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘ and 1 2 Ad(￿￿ ￿). Hence, there is a unique ￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿;￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘] such that
A 2 Ad(￿). (See Figure 8.)
(ii) Monetary equilibrium.
From Lemma 7, for given ￿ there is a unique ! solution to the buyer￿ s problem. Since A 2 Ad(￿), it
satis￿es (54) with a = A. Hence, d!
di < 0 whenever ! > 0 and there exists i0(A) = ￿hSh
!(0;A) + ￿‘S‘
!(0;A)
such that ! > 0 for all i < i0. Since Sh
!(0;A) < 1 and S‘









> 0 for all qh < q￿ (from Lemma 6) then i0(A) > 0.
(iii) PM allocations.
From (i) ￿ is unique. From Lemma 7, if ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ then there is a unique solution to (36). Moreover,
from Lemma 6, if ￿ = ￿h then (qh;dh;￿h) is unique and if ￿ = ￿‘ then q‘ and
￿
￿￿‘ + ￿￿‘d‘ are uniquely
determined. If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ then a(j) can vary across buyers but ! is unique and ! + ￿￿‘a(j) ￿ c(q￿) for all
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Figure 8: Graph of Ad(￿)
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) From the proof of Proposition 5, d!
di < 0 whenever ! > 0. Assume




































Hence, dVh=di > 0:
(ii) De￿ne ￿ A(i) = [c(q￿) ￿ ^ !(i)]=￿￿‘ where ^ !(i) is the unique solution to (71)-(72). As shown in the proof
of Proposition 5, Ad(￿￿ ￿) = [
c(q
￿)￿^ !(i)
￿￿‘ ;1) and Ad = fag with ￿￿‘a < c(q￿) ￿ ^ !(i) if ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ (since a is a
decreasing function of ￿). From market-clearing, if A < ￿ A(i) then ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ and !+￿￿‘a < c(q￿) (See proof of
Lemma 7.) From the proof of Proposition 5, da=di = ￿H21=jHj > 0 with H21 = ￿hSh
!a(!;a) + ￿‘S‘
!a(!;a).
So, A 2 Ad(￿) implies that d￿=di > 0. If A > ￿ A(i) then ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ and d￿=di = 0.
(iii) From (54), as i ! 0, Sh
!;S‘
! ! 0 and hence qh;q‘ ! q￿ and ! ! c(q￿). From Lemma 6, dh ! 0 and
￿h ! c(q￿). From the proof of Proposition 6, ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ for all A > ￿ A(i) where limi!0 ￿ A(i) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. From (55),





















Similarly, from (54), and after replacing Sh
! and S‘










+ ￿‘ ^ S
0
‘:









































‘ [￿h￿(qh) + ￿‘]
￿
:
From (54), ￿(qh) > 0 (since Sh
! > 0) for all i > 0. Moreover, ￿‘ < ￿ ￿ < ￿h. Hence, Ra > Rm:
50Supplementary appendices
B. Re￿nements of sequential equilibrium
In this Appendix, I describe two re￿nements of sequential equilibrium in the context of the bargaining game
studied in this paper: the Intuitive Criterion and the undefeated equilibrium. I focus on the model of Section
5 where the real asset is only traded in the PM.
A typical signaling game has the following structure. There are two players: a sender of information and
a receiver of information. In the context of the bargaining game in this paper, the sender is the buyer who
makes an o⁄er and the receiver is the seller who accepts or rejects the o⁄er. The timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws a type t for the sender according to some (commonly known) probability distribution
￿(t). Here, the set of types is T = f‘;hg and ￿(‘) = ￿‘ and ￿(h) = ￿h.
2. The sender (buyer) privately observes the type t, and he sends an o⁄er o to the receiver (seller). Here,
an o⁄er is a triple (q;d;!) 2 R3
+ where q is the output, d is the transfer of the real asset, and ! is the
amount of real balances.
3. The receiver observes the o⁄er o and takes an action r. Here, the set of actions is fY;Ng. If r = Y
then the o⁄er is accepted; If r = N then the o⁄er is rejected.
The payo⁄ of the buyer is Ub(t;o;r) = ￿i! + [u(q) ￿ ￿￿td ￿ !]Ifr=Y g. The payo⁄ of the seller is
Us(t;o;r) = [￿c(q) + ￿￿td + !]Ifr=Y g. After receiving the o⁄er o, the seller forms a posterior probability
assessment over the set of types of the buyer, ￿(tjo). The best response of the seller is





In the context of the bargaining game, the best response of the seller can be reexpressed as
BR(￿;o) = arg max
r2fY;Ng
￿
[￿c(q) + ￿ [￿(hjo)￿h + ￿(‘jo)￿‘]d + !]Ifr=Y g
￿
:
I adopt the tie-breaking rule according to which r = Y whenever BR(￿;o) = fY;Ng.
The equilibrium concept for the extensive game with imperfect information is that of sequential equilib-
rium. It is a pair of strategies and a belief system with the following properties. Strategies are sequentially
51rational: for each information set of each player i, the strategy of player i is a best response to the other
player￿ s strategy, given i0s belief at that information set.
Let o denote a strategy for a buyer. It is a mapping from the set of types to the set of feasible o⁄ers. Let
r denotes a strategy for a seller. It is a mapping from the set of feasible o⁄ers to the set fY;Ng. A (pure
strategy) sequential equilibrium is a pro￿le of strategies (o￿;r￿) and a seller￿ s belief system, ￿
￿, such that
the following is true.
1. For all t 2 T, o￿(t) 2 argmaxo0 Ub(t;o0;r￿(o0))
2. For all o, r￿(o) 2BR(￿
￿(o);o)
3. ￿
￿ satis￿es Bayes￿rule whenever possible (and is unconstrained for out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers)
In the context of the bargaining game studied in this paper, the buyer￿ s strategy can be simpli￿ed by
noticing the following. First, Ub(t;o0;r￿(o0)) ￿ 0 for all o0 such that r￿(o0) = fNg. Second, from the tie-
breaking rule, Ub(t;o0;r￿(o0)) = 0 and r￿(o0) = fY g for o0 = (0;0;0). Hence, with no loss, the buyer can
choose an o⁄er among those that are accepted by sellers, i.e.,
o￿(t) 2 argmax
o0 Ub(t;o0;Y ) s.t. fY g 2 BR(￿
￿(o0);o0):
The buyer￿ s problem becomes then (19)-(20).
The Intuitive Criterion
The Cho-Kreps (1987) re￿nement is based on the (intuitive) idea that out-of-equilibrium actions should
never be attributed to a type who would not bene￿t from it under any circumstances. For a subset K ￿ T,





Suppose K = T = f‘;hg. Then,
BR(T;o) = fY g if ￿ c(q) + ￿￿‘d + ! > 0
= fNg if ￿ c(q) + ￿d￿h + ! < 0
= fY;Ng otherwise.
52Consider a proposed equilibrium where the payo⁄ of a buyer of type t is denoted U￿
t . According to Cho
and Kreps (1987, p.202), this proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if there exists an unsent o⁄er
o0 such that:
1. U￿
‘ > maxr2BR(f‘;hg;o0) Ub(‘;o0;r)
2. U￿
h < minr2BR(fhg;o0) Ub(h;o0;r)
According to the ￿rst requirement, the unsent o⁄er o0 would reduce the payo⁄ of the ‘￿type buyer
compared to his equilibrium payo⁄ irrespective of the inference the seller draws from o0. Consequently, the
seller should attribute the o⁄er o0 to an h￿type buyer. If he does so, the second requirement speci￿es that
the h￿type buyer should obtain a higher utility with o0 compare to his equilibrium payo⁄.
In the bargaining game, the buyer￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is bounded below by 0. Hence, the second
requirement implies minr2BR(fhg;o0) Ub(h;o0;r) > 0, which requires fY g 2 BR(fhg;o0) (where I am making
use of the tie-breaking rule). Since fY g 2 BR(f‘;hg;o0), the ￿rst requirement becomes U￿
‘ > Ub(‘;o0;Y ).
To summarize, a proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if there is an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er that
satis￿es (61)-(63).
Undefeated sequential equilibria
Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) criticized the logical foundations of re￿nements based
on forward induction (such as the Intuitive Criterion). They argue that it is di¢ cult to interpret out-of-
equilibrium messages as signals. For instance, consider a sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game that
is pooling. It has been shown that an h￿type buyer could make an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er that would
make him better-o⁄ and that would hurt an ‘￿type buyer. (See Lemma 1.) By making such an o⁄er the
h￿type buyer hopes to convince the seller that he is an h￿type. But if the seller ￿nds the Intuitive Criterion
appealing he knows that the h￿type buyer will alter his o⁄er, and hence he should update his belief about the
buyer￿ s type if he does send the equilibrium message. ￿But if the (seller) does this, in the determination of
whether a particular type might bene￿t from sending some disequilibrium message, the relevant comparison
is not with the utility that he would receive in the proposed equilibrium but rather the utility that he would
receive given that (the seller) is thinking in this way￿ . (Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1993,
p.250.) They introduce a new re￿nement, based on the notion of undefeated equilibrium, that takes care of
some of these concerns.
53An equilibrium is composed of a strategy for buyers, o, that speci￿es an o⁄er for each type, an acceptance
rule for sellers, r, and a belief system for sellers, ￿. According to Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1993, p.254, De￿nition 2) an equilibrium (o￿ ;r￿ ;￿
0) defeats (o;r;￿) if there exists an o⁄er o0 such that:
1. For all t, o(t) 6= o0 and K ￿ ft 2 T jo0(t) = o0g 6= ?
2. For all t 2 K, Ub [t;o0;r0(o0)] ￿ Ub [t;o(t);r(o(t))] with a strict inequality for one t in K
3. ￿(tjo0) 6= p(t)￿(t)=
X
t0
p(t0)￿(t0) for at least one t in K where p(t) = 1 if t 2 K and Ub [t;o0;r0(o0)] >
Ub [t;o(t);r(o(t))] and p(t) = 0 if t = 2 K.
So, for a sequential equilibrium to be defeated there must exist an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er that is used
in an alternative sequential equilibrium by a subset K of buyers￿types (requirement 1). For all buyers
with types in K, their payo⁄ at the alternative equilibrium must be greater than the one at the proposed
equilibrium with a strict inequality for at least one type (requirement 2). Finally, the belief system in
the proposed equilibrium does not update sellers￿prior belief conditional on the buyer￿ s type being in K
(requirement 3).
54C. Undefeated monetary equilibria
The Intuitive Criterion is based on the simple idea that one should not attribute an out-of-equilibrium action
to a type that would not bene￿t from it under any circumstances. While it is an intuitive re￿nement, its
logic as well as some of the properties of the equilibria it selects have not stayed unchallenged.41 Mailath,
Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) introduced an alternative re￿nement, undefeated equilibria, which
addresses some of the shortcomings of re￿nements based on forward induction. In this section, I check the
robustness of the results by investigating the conditions under which the equilibrium selected by the Intuitive
Criterion is undefeated.42 I focus on the model in Section 5 where the real asset is only traded in the PM.
The idea of an undefeated equilibrium is as follows. Consider a proposed sequential equilibrium and an
out-of-equilibrium o⁄er ~ o. Suppose there is an alternative sequential equilibrium in which a subset of buyers￿
types choose ~ o. Moreover, those buyers prefer the alternative equilibrium to the proposed equilibrium. The
test requires seller￿ s beliefs at that action in the original equilibrium to be consistent with the set of buyers
who would bene￿t from the out-of-equilibrium o⁄er ~ o (see the Appendix B for a formal de￿nition). If the
beliefs are not consistent, the second equilibrium defeats the proposed equilibrium.
In the following the attention will be restricted to symmetric equilibria in pure strategies.
Lemma 8 The separating equilibrium that satis￿es the Intuitive Criterion is the only undefeated equilibrium
if
￿ Ub
h ￿ ￿(1 + i)!p + u(qp) ￿ ￿￿hdp < Ub
h ￿ ￿(1 + i)!h + u(qh) ￿ ￿￿hdh; (75)
where (qh;dh;!h) is the solution to (24)-(26) and
(qp;dp;!p) = arg max
!;q;d￿A
f￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿hdg (76)
s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿ (￿h￿h + ￿‘￿‘)d + ! = 0; (77)
Conversely, if ￿ Ub
h > Ub
h then there is an undefeated equilibrium and it is pooling.
41One of the most problematic aspect of the equilibrium selected by the Intuitive Criterion might be its lack of continuity
with respect to perturbations of the prior beliefs. In particular, the equilibrium obtained by taking the limit as ￿‘ goes to 0
does not approach the complete information equilibrium.
42As Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993, p.265) put it,
￿[T]here is no reason that di⁄erent re￿nements shouldn￿ t be employed in the analysis of a single game. Various
implausibilities may be exhibited in di⁄erent equilibria of a game, and hence, considering di⁄erent re￿nements of
the equilibrium set for a single game is like looking at the game from di⁄erent vantage points￿.
55Proof. First, I establish that among the separating sequential equilibria, the only one that can be unde-
feated is the one that satis￿es the Intuitive Criterion. Consider a sequential equilibrium that is separating
and denote ^ Ub
h the payo⁄ of the h￿type buyer at this equilibrium. The o⁄er of the ‘￿type buyer is his
complete information o⁄er, (q‘;d‘;!‘). Suppose that the o⁄er (^ qh; ^ dh; ^ !h) of the h￿type at the proposed
equilibrium is di⁄erent from (qh;dh;!h) that solves (24)-(26). Since (qh;dh;!h) is an o⁄er made by the
h￿type only, and ^ Ub
h < Ub
h, then the proposed equilibrium is defeated by the unique separating equilibrium
that satis￿es the Intuitive Criterion.
Second, suppose (75) holds. Since, from (76)-(77), ￿ Ub
h is the highest payo⁄ an h￿type buyer can reach
at a pooling equilibrium, any pooling equilibrium is defeated by the Pareto-e¢ cient separating equilibrium.
Third, suppose that ￿ Ub
h > Ub
h. The pooling equilibrium (qp;dp;!p) defeats the Pareto-e¢ cient separating
equilibrium. To see this, notice that the h￿type buyer strictly prefers the pooling equilibrium. Moreover,
the ‘￿type buyer also prefers the pooling equilibrium, i.e.,
￿(1 + i)!p + u(qp) ￿ ￿￿‘dp > U(￿‘): (78)
Indeed, from (77) ￿c(qp) + ￿￿hdp + !p > 0. Since the solution to (24)-(26) is such the seller￿ s participation
constraint and the ‘￿type buyer incentive-compatibility constraint hold, ￿ Ub
h > Ub
h implies that the incentive-
compatibility constraint is violated, and hence (78) holds. Finally, the pooling equilibrium (qp;dp;!p) is
undefeated among pooling equilibria because the payo⁄ of the h￿type is maximized. Hence, any out-of-
equilibrium o⁄er that would correspond to a di⁄erent pooling equilibrium can be attributed to an ‘￿type
buyer (so that the payo⁄ of the ‘￿type buyer associated with this out-of-equilibrium o⁄er would be no
greater than U(￿‘)).
De￿ne the lexicographically maximum (Lex Max) pooling allocation as the solution to (76)-(77).43 (Notice
that the Lex Max pooling allocation corresponds to a sequential equilibrium if the payo⁄of the ‘￿type buyer
is at least equal to his complete information payo⁄.) The lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium
(LMSE) corresponds to the Lex Max pooling allocation if ￿ Ub
h ￿ Ub
h, and to the separating equilibrium given
by the Intuitive Criterion otherwise.44 The LMSE is intuitively appealing because it corresponds to the
preferred sequential equilibrium of an h￿type buyer. Lemma 8 shows that the LMSE is undefeated (Mailath
43Consider two sequential equilibria with the associated pro￿le of payo⁄s for the buyers (uh;u‘) and (u0
h;u0
‘). The ￿rst
equilibrium lexicographically dominates the second one if uh > u0
h or uh = u0
h and u‘ > u0
‘.
44A belief system consistent with the pooling outcome is as follows. For the equilibrium o⁄er, the Bayes rule implies
￿(qp;dp;!p) = ￿h. For all out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers that generate a payo⁄ to ‘￿type buyers greater than U(￿‘) then ￿ = 0.
For other out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers, ￿ = ￿h.
56et al., 1993, Theorem 1) and if it is completely separating, it is the only undefeated (pure strategy) sequential
equilibrium (Mailath et al., 1993, Theorem 2).
The determination of undefeated equilibria is illustrated in Figure 9 in the case without ￿at money. The
separating equilibrium is such that the ‘￿type buyer gets his complete information payo⁄ (the indi⁄erence
curves Us
‘ and Ub
‘ are tangent) and the trade in a match with an h￿type buyers is such that both the
participation constraint of the seller and the incentive-compatibility condition for the ‘￿type bind (Us
h and
Ub
‘ intersect). The Lex Max pooling allocation is at the tangency point between the indi⁄erence curve of the
seller given his prior belief, ￿ Us, and the indi⁄erence curve of an h￿type buyer. If the utility of the h￿type
buyer at separating equilibrium is greater than his utility at the pooling allocation, as in Figure 9, then the













Figure 9: Undefeated equilibria
The next Lemma characterizes the Lex Max pooling allocation. Let qm(i) denote the value of q that
solves u0(q)=c0(q) = 1 + i.
Lemma 9 The Lex Max pooling allocation (q;d;!) that solves (76)-(77) is such that:
1. If i < ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1 then d = 0, q = qm(i) and ! = c(q).
2. If i = ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1 then qm(i) and ! + ￿￿ ￿d = c(q).
573. If i > ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1 then:






￿ 1 + i then d = A, q = qm(i) and ! = c(q) ￿ ￿￿ ￿A.






￿ ￿h=￿ ￿ then u0(q) = ￿h
￿ ￿ c0(q), ! = 0 and d = c(q)=￿￿ ￿.






2 (￿h=￿ ￿;1 + i) then q = c￿1 (￿￿ ￿A), ! = 0 and d = A.




fu(q) ￿ (1 + i)c(q) + ￿d[(1 + i)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿h]g
where ￿ ￿ = ￿h￿h + ￿‘￿‘. If i < ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1 then d = 0, u0(q)=c0(q) = 1 + i and ! = c(q). This gives case 1 in
the Lemma. If i = ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1 then u0(q)=c0(q) = 1 + i and ! + ￿￿ ￿d = c(q) (the exact combination of ! and
d is indeterminate.) This gives case 2 in the Lemma. If i > ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1 then d = A, u0(q)=c0(q) = 1 + i and
! = c(q)￿￿￿ ￿A provided that u0(q)=c0(q) ￿ 1+i at q = c￿1(￿￿ ￿A), which guarantees that ! ￿ 0. This gives












If d ￿ A does not bind then u0(q) = ￿h
￿ ￿ c0(q) and d = c(q)=￿￿ ￿. The constraint d ￿ A can then be reexpressed






￿ ￿h=￿ ￿. If d ￿ A binds then q = c￿1(￿￿ ￿A). The constraint
! = 0 requires u0(q)=c0(q) ￿ 1 + i. If c(q) ￿ ￿￿ ￿A then the condition holds if i ￿ ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1. If d ￿ A binds
then u0(q)=c0(q) < 1 + i must be evaluated at q = c￿1(￿￿ ￿A). This gives cases 3(b) and 3(c) in the Lemma.
The pooling allocation is such that ￿at money is the only means of payment provided that the cost of
real balances is su¢ ciently low, i < ￿h=￿ ￿￿1. Intuitively, if the two types of buyers are pooled in equilibrium
then the h￿type buyer incurs a cost equal to (￿h￿￿ ￿)=￿ ￿ per unit of the real asset he sells while the expected
cost of holding real balances is i. In contrast, in the separating equilibrium both types of buyers use the real
asset as means of payment. The quantities traded in the pooling monetary equilibrium are the same as the
ones that buyers would trade in a separating monetary equilibrium provided that both buyers hold money.
Proposition 8 There exists ￿ ￿h 2 (0;1) such that for all ￿h < ￿ ￿h the only undefeated equilibrium is the (sep-
arating) equilibrium that satis￿es the Intuitive Criterion whereas for all ￿h > ￿ ￿h any undefeated equilibrium
is pooling.
58Proof. From (24)-(26) Ub
h, the utility of an h￿type buyer at the separating equilibrium, is independent
of ￿h. From Lemma 9, ￿ Ub
h, the utility of an h￿type buyer at the Lex Max pooling allocation, is a continuous
and (weakly) increasing function of ￿h. It is strictly increasing provided that i > ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1, or equivalently,
￿h >
￿h￿(1+i)￿‘
(1+i)(￿h￿￿‘), and it is constant otherwise.
If ￿h = 1 then (qp;dp;!p) solves (24) subject to (25) without (26) being imposed. From Lemma 4, (26)
is binding at the separating equilibrium. Hence, ￿ Ub
h > Ub
h.
If ￿h = 0 then the problem (76)-(77) is analogous to (22) except from the fact that the objective of the
‘￿type buyer is replaced by the objective of the h￿type buyer. Hence,
￿(1 + i)!p + u(qp) ￿ ￿￿‘dp ￿ U(￿‘)
and (26) holds at (qp;dp;!p), with a strict inequality if dp = 0 since d‘ > 0. Moreover,
0 = ￿c(qp) + ￿￿‘dp + !p ￿ ￿c(qp) + ￿￿hdp + !p;
with a strict inequality if dp > 0. From Lemma 4, both (25) and (26) are binding at the optimum so that
￿ Ub
h < Ub
h. Consequently, there is a unique ￿ ￿h 2 (0;1) such that ￿ Ub
h = Ub
h; for all ￿h > ￿ ￿h, ￿ Ub
h > Ub
h; for all
￿h < ￿ ￿h, ￿ Ub
h < Ub
h.
The equilibrium that satis￿es the Intuitive Criterion is the unique undefeated equilibrium provided that
the fraction of h￿type buyers is not too large. Intuitively, h￿type buyers face a trade-o⁄ between the tight-
ness of the seller￿ s participation constraint and the tightness of the ‘￿type buyer￿ s incentive-compatibility
constraint. If the fraction of ‘￿type buyers is su¢ ciently small then h￿type buyers cannot loosen much the
seller￿ s participation constraint by separating themselves from the ‘￿type buyers, i.e., ￿‘￿‘ + ￿h￿h is close
to ￿h. However, they would have to tighten signi￿cantly the incentive-compatibility condition to separate
themselves from the ‘￿type buyers. Hence, h￿type buyers are happily pooled with ‘￿type ones.
Next, I investigate how monetary policy a⁄ects the set of undefeated equilibria.
Proposition 9 For all i < ￿h=￿ ￿￿1, the unique undefeated equilibrium is the unique (separating) equilibrium
that satis￿es the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof. Consider the pooling allocation in (76)-(77). From Lemma 9, for all i < ￿h=￿ ￿￿1 then d = 0 and
￿ Ub
h(i) = ￿(1 + i)c[qm(i)] + u[qm(i)]:
59Moreover, d￿ Ub
h=di = ￿c[qm(i)] < 0. Consider next the Pareto-e¢ cient separating equilibrium. For all
i < i2(A), de￿ned in the proof of Proposition 2,
Ub
h(i) = ￿(1 + i)c[qm(i)] + u[qm(i)] + i￿￿hdh(i);
and Ub
h(i) = Ub
h[i2(A)] for all i > i2(A). Since dh(i) > 0 for all i > 0 then Ub
h(i) > ￿ Ub
h(i) for all i < ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ 1
and the unique undefeated equilibrium is the separating equilibrium.
Provided that the cost of holding real balances is not too high, the unique undefeated equilibrium is
separating. Hence, the results in Section 5 are robust to the adoption of the alternative re￿nement from
Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993).
A second insights from Proposition 9 is that monetary policy can a⁄ect the nature of the (undefeated)
equilibrium. Suppose that i is su¢ ciently large so that no monetary equilibrium exists. From Proposition 8,
provided that ￿h is su¢ ciently large, any undefeated equilibrium is pooling. Consider a reduction of the cost
of holding real balances. From Proposition 9, provided that i is su¢ ciently low, the unique undefeated equi-
librium is separating. Hence, the reduction of the money growth rate changes the nature of the equilibrium
from pooling to separating.45
45A similar result is found in Jafarey and Rupert (2001) where the nonmonetary equilibrium is always pooling while the
monetary equilibrium can be separating.
60D. Signaling with more than two types
This appendix shows the robustness of the results if one allows for more than two states for the dividend
of the real asset. In particular, there is a unique equilibrium of the bargaining game and it is separating. I
consider the version of the model in Section 5 where the real asset is only traded in the PM. I describe the
case where the set of buyers￿is T = f1;:::;Kg with K ￿ 3 and K is ￿nite. The dividend in the state k is ￿k
with 0 < ￿1 < ￿2 < ::: < ￿K. The measure of buyers of type k is ￿k.
In the PM the seller observes the o⁄er (q;d;!) made by the buyer, and he forms a belief about the buyer￿ s
type. Denote ￿(q;d;!) the probability measure of the buyer￿ s type ￿ conditional on the o⁄er (q;d;!) being
made. Formally, Pr[k 2 S] =
R
ISd￿(q;d;!) where IS(k) is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if k 2 S.
Consider a sequential equilibrium and let Ub
k denote the payo⁄ of a buyer of type ￿k. The proposed
equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987, p.202) if there is an unsent o⁄er (~ q; ~ d; ~ !) and
a set of types S ￿ T such that
￿(1 + i)~ ! + u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿k ~ d < Ub
k 8k 2 S (79)
￿(1 + i)~ ! + u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿k ~ d > Ub
k for some k 2 TnS (80)
￿c(~ q) + ~ ! + E~ ￿ [￿k]￿ ~ d ￿ 0 8~ ￿ : supp(~ ￿) ￿ TnS: (81)
According to (79), the unsent o⁄er makes buyers with types included in S strictly worse o⁄ compared to
their equilibrium payo⁄. According to (80), it makes at least one buyer with type included in TnS strictly
better o⁄. According to (81) the o⁄er is acceptable for any belief system that puts no weight on the types
in S.
The next lemma shows that there is no o⁄er involving a transfer of the real asset that is pooling.
Lemma 10 In any equilibrium, there is no pooling o⁄er such that d > 0.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium where a subset ￿ T ￿ T of buyers￿types (with at least two distinct
elements) make the same o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d; ￿ !) with ￿ d > 0. Hence, the equilibrium payo⁄s are
Ub
k ￿ ￿(1 + i)￿ ! + u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿k ￿ d; 8k 2 ￿ T:
This o⁄er satis￿es the seller￿ s participation constraint. Hence,
￿c(￿ q) + E￿(￿ q;￿ d;￿ !) [￿]￿ ￿ d + ￿ ! ￿ 0; (82)
61where ￿(￿ q; ￿ d; ￿ !) is determined by Bayes￿rule.46 Let k = max ￿ T and k0 = max ￿ Tnfkg. Suppose that a k￿type
buyer deviates and o⁄ers (~ q; ~ d; ~ !) such that ~ ! = ￿ !, ~ d = ￿ d ￿ " where " 2
￿
0; ￿ d + [￿ ! ￿ c(￿ q)]=￿￿k
￿
, and
￿(1 + i)~ ! + u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿k0 ~ d < Ub
k0 (83)




u(￿ q) ￿ u(~ q)
￿"
< ￿k: (85)
First, I establish that the set of o⁄ers (~ q; ~ d; ~ !) that satisfy the conditions above is not empty. Since,
from Bayes￿rule E￿(￿ q;￿ d;￿ !) [￿] < ￿k, (82) implies c(￿ q) < ￿￿k ￿ d + ￿ ! and
￿




k ￿ 0 (in any equilibrium the buyers￿payo⁄s are nonnegative since (q;d;!) = (0;0;0) is
always available) implies u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿k ￿ d ￿ ￿ ! ￿ 0 and hence
u(￿ q)
￿￿k
￿ " ￿ ￿ d +
￿ !
￿￿k
￿ " > 0
(since " < ￿ d + [￿ ! ￿ c(￿ q)]=￿￿k.) So for any " 2
￿
0; ￿ d + [￿ ! ￿ c(￿ q)]=￿￿k
￿
there is a ~ q ￿ 0 satisfying
u(￿ q) ￿ ￿"￿k < u(~ q) < u(￿ q) ￿ ￿"￿k0
and hence (85).
Second, I show that
￿(1 + i)~ ! + u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿k00 ~ d < Ub
k00 8k00 < k0: (86)
By incentive compatibility,
Ub
k00 ￿ ￿(1 + i)￿ ! + u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿k00 ￿ d:
From (85), u(￿ q) > u(~ q) + ￿"￿k > u(~ q) + ￿"￿k00. Since ~ ! = ￿ ! and ~ d = ￿ d ￿ ",
￿(1 + i)~ ! + u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿k00 ~ d < ￿(1 + i)￿ ! + u(￿ q) ￿ ￿￿k00 ￿ d ￿ Ub
k00:
This proves (86).
Finally, I show that any o⁄er (~ q; ~ d; ~ !) disquali￿es the proposed equilibrium according to the Intuitive
Criterion. From (83) and (86), the set of types S such that (79) is true is S ￿ f￿k00 : k00 ￿ k0g. From
46In any equilibrium buyers make an acceptable o⁄er. Indeed, their payo⁄s are bounded away from 0 since they can always
achieve maxq;![￿(1 + i)! + u(q)] s.t. c(q) = !.
62(84), the condition (80) is satis￿ed for the buyer￿ s type k. The condition " < ￿ d + [￿ ! ￿ c(￿ q)]=￿￿k implies
c(￿ q) < ￿￿k
￿￿ d ￿ "
￿
+ ￿ !. From (85), ￿ q > ~ q. So,
c(~ q) < ￿￿k ~ d + ￿ ! ￿ ￿E~ ￿(~ q;~ d;~ !) [￿] ~ d + ￿ !
for any ~ ￿ such that supp~ ￿(~ q; ~ d; ~ !) ￿ TnS, since TnS ￿ fk;k +1;:::;Kg. Consequently, (81) is also satis￿ed.
A buyer reveals his type through his equilibrium o⁄er (unless d = 0 in which case the buyer￿ s private
information is irrelevant for the seller￿ s payo⁄). Let (qk;!k;dk) indicate the o⁄er made by a buyer of type k.
The next Lemma shows that the quantity of the asset transferred to the seller is a non-increasing function
of the buyer￿ s type. The proof of this result is based on incentive compatibility.
Lemma 11 If k > k0 then dk ￿ dk0.
Proof. Incentive-compatibility requires that for any two types k and k0,
Ub
k = ￿(1 + i)!k + u(qk) ￿ ￿￿kdk ￿ ￿(1 + i)!k0 + u(qk0) ￿ ￿￿kdk0: (87)
From (87), and interchanging k and k0, one can show that
￿k0 (dk ￿ dk0) ￿ ￿k (dk ￿ dk0):
Hence, if k > k0 then dk ￿ dk0.
So, the result according to which buyers with a high type spend a smaller fraction of their real asset in
the PM than buyers with a low type is robust across mechanisms. The next proposition characterizes the
buyers￿equilibrium o⁄ers and payo⁄s.




f￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿1dg (88)
s.t. ￿ c(q) + ! + ￿￿1d = 0: (89)




f￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿kdg (90)
s.t. ￿ c(q) + ! + ￿￿kd ￿ 0 (91)
￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿k￿1d ￿ Ub
k￿1: (92)
63Proof. The o⁄ers f(qk;dk;!k)gK
k=1 must be incentive-compatible, i.e.,
￿(1 + i)!k + u(qk) ￿ ￿￿k0dk ￿ Ub
k0 (93)
for all k;k0 2 T. First, I establish that (92) implies that the incentive-compatibility condition (93) holds for
all k0 < k and k ￿ 2. From (92),
Ub
k ￿ ￿(1 + i)!k + u(qk) ￿ ￿￿kdk ￿ Ub
k￿1 ￿ ￿dk (￿k ￿ ￿k￿1);






￿dt (￿t ￿ ￿t￿1); 8n = 1;::;k ￿ 1:
By de￿nition of Ub
k,
￿(1 + i)!k + u(qk) ￿ ￿￿k￿ndk = Ub





￿dt (￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿￿k￿ndk + ￿￿kdk:
Rearrange the sum on the right-hand side, and use an appropriate change of variable to obtain




￿ (dt ￿ dt￿1)￿t￿1 ￿ ￿￿k￿n (dk ￿ dk￿n):
Using the fact that dk ￿ dk￿n =
Pk
t=k￿n+1 (dt ￿ dt￿1), the inequality becomes




￿ (dt ￿ dt￿1)(￿t￿1 ￿ ￿k￿n):
From Lemma 11, (dt ￿ dt￿1)(￿t￿1 ￿ ￿k￿n) ￿ 0 for all t 2 fk ￿ n + 1;:::;kg. Hence, ￿(1 + i)!k + u(qk) ￿
￿￿k￿ndk ￿ Ub
k￿n for all n = 1;::;k ￿ 1.
Next, I prove that the incentive-compatibility condition (93) holds for all k0 > k. The proof is by
induction. Suppose
￿(1 + i)!k + u(qk) ￿ ￿￿k+ndk ￿ Uk+n (94)
for n > 0. This inequality holds at n = 0. From (91),
￿c(qk) + !k + ￿￿k+n+1dk > ￿c(qk) + !k + ￿￿kdk ￿ 0: (95)
64From (94) and (95), (qk;dk;!k) satis￿es (91)-(92) when k is replaced by k + n + 1. Hence, one can deduce
from (90) that
￿(1 + i)!k + u(qk) ￿ ￿￿k+n+1dk ￿ Ub
k+n+1:
So, I have checked that the incentive-compatibility conditions hold for all k;k0. To show that (q1;!1;d1)
is the only possible o⁄er for a ￿1￿buyer notice from Lemma 10 that a buyer with the lowest type cannot
do better than his complete information payo⁄ and this payo⁄ is always achievable for any belief system ￿
(since E￿ [￿] ￿ ￿1).
Next, I show that the solution (qk;dk;!k) to (90)-(92) for k ￿ 2 is the only one that can satisfy the
Intuitive Criterion. Suppose that the equilibrium payo⁄ of a k￿buyer is ~ Uk < Ub
k. Replace Ub
k￿1 in (92) by
Ub




k) = arg max
(q;d;!)
f￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿kdg
s.t. ￿ c(q) + ! + ￿￿kd ￿ 0
￿(1 + i)! + u(q) ￿ ￿￿k￿1d ￿ Ub
k￿1 ￿ ":
Denote U"
k the value to this problem. Since U"
k is continuous in " there exists " > 0 such that ~ Uk < U"
k. By





k￿n, 8n = 1;::;k ￿ 1:




k) is acceptable. So the proposed equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Finally, I construct a belief system that generates f(qk;dk;!k)gK
k=1 as the solution to the buyers￿problems.
The belief system is such that
R
Ifkgd￿(qk;dk;!k) = 1 from Bayes￿rule. The beliefs for out-of-equilibrium
o⁄ers are speci￿ed as follows. All out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers that generate a payo⁄ strictly greater than Ub
1 to
a type-1 buyer are attributed to a ￿1￿buyer. By construction these o⁄ers are rejected by sellers. Among
the remaining o⁄ers, all out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers that generate a payo⁄ strictly greater than Ub
2 to a type-2
buyer are attributed to a type-2 buyer. These o⁄ers satisfy (92) for k = 2. Hence, they must violate (91)
and, as a consequence, they are rejected by sellers. And so on. The out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers that make all
players worse-o⁄ are attributed to the highest type.
65The buyer with the lowest type makes his complete information o⁄er. Buyers of type k > 1 maximize their
expected utility subject to the participation constraint of sellers and the incentive-compatibility condition
of buyers of type k ￿ 1.
The problem (90)-(92) is formally identical to (24)-(26). One can make use of Lemma 4 to provide the
following characterization of the equilibrium o⁄ers.















k￿1 ￿ [u(qk) ￿ (1 + i)c(qk)]
[(1 + i)￿k ￿ ￿k￿1]￿
(97)
and
u0 (qk) ￿ (1 + i)c0(qk) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if !k > 0: (98)
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Figure 10: Equilibrium o⁄ers (economy without ￿at money)
The determination of the equilibrium o⁄ers is illustrated in Figure 10 in the case without ￿at money.
The indi⁄erence curve of a seller matched with a buyer of type k is denoted Us
k. The indi⁄erence curve of a
66buyer of type k is denoted Ub
k. The sellers￿indi⁄erence curves go through the origin since their participation
constraints are binding. Assuming the constraint d ￿ A is not binding, the terms of trade (q1;d1) are
determined at the tangency of the seller￿ s indi⁄erence curve and the buyer￿ s indi⁄erence curve. In matches
where the buyer￿ s type is k > 1 then the terms of trade (qk;dk) are at the intersection of the seller￿ s
indi⁄erence curve, Us
k, and the indi⁄erence curve of the buyer of type k ￿ 1, Ub
k￿1.
67E. Asset pricing under symmetric information
In order to isolate the role of private information, I analyze in this Appendix the economy with symmetric
information: buyers and sellers in the PM have the same information about the future dividend of the asset.
Complete information
Consider a match in the PM between a buyer and a seller. The buyer holds ! real balances (expressed in
terms of their discounted value in the next AM) and a units of capital. The future dividend of each unit











s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿￿d +
￿
￿




￿ ￿ !; d ￿ a: (101)
If ￿￿a + ! ￿ c(q￿) then the solution to (99)-(101) is q = q￿ and ￿￿d + ! = c(q￿). Otherwise, q =










￿i! ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)a + ￿h ^ S(! + ￿￿ha) + ￿‘ ^ S(! + ￿￿‘a)
o
; (102)
where ￿￿￿￿ ￿ in (102) represents the cost of investing in capital: it is equal to the price of capital in the AM
minus the discounted expected dividend in the subsequent AM.




a(j)dj = A: (103)
(Recall that sellers cannot produce in the AM and hence cannot acquire capital.)
An equilibrium is a list of portfolios, a pro￿le of buyers￿strategies in the PM, and the price of capital
that satisfy (99)-(103).
The following lemma characterizes the buyer￿ s portfolio choice.
68Lemma 13 Assume ￿ > ￿￿ ￿. If (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿‘ 6= i or ￿‘ ^ S
0
[￿‘c(q￿)=￿h] < i then the buyer￿ s problem (102)
admits a unique solution. It satis￿es
￿i + ￿h ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿ha) + ￿‘ ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿‘a) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if ! > 0 (104)
￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿) + ￿h￿￿h ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿ha) + ￿‘￿￿‘ ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿‘a) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if a > 0: (105)
If (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿‘ = i and ￿‘ ^ S
0
[￿‘c(q￿)=￿h] ￿ i then any (!;a) such that ￿‘ ^ S
0
(!+￿￿‘a) = i and !+￿￿ha ￿
c(q￿) is solution to (102). If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ then any (!;a) 2 f0g ￿ [c(q￿)=￿￿‘;1) is solution to (102). Finally, if
￿ < ￿￿ ￿ then there is no solution to (102).
Proof. Since ^ S
0




, then ^ S is concave and
the buyer￿ s problem (102) is concave as well. The ￿rst-order conditions (104) and (105) are then necessary
and su¢ cient. Three cases are distinguished.
(i) ￿ > ￿￿ ￿. The solution to (102) cannot be such that ! + ￿￿‘a > c(q￿). Indeed, if ! + ￿￿‘a > c(q￿)
then ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿ha) = ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿‘a) = u0(q￿)=c0(q￿) ￿ 1 = 0. But then (104)-(105) imply ! = a = 0. A
contradiction. So, one can restrict (!;a) to the compact set f(!;a) 2 R2+ : ! +￿￿‘a ￿ c(q￿)g and from the
Theorem of the Maximum a solution to (102) exists. Next, I show that the problem (102) is strictly jointly





h + ￿‘ ^ S
00
‘ ￿h￿￿h ^ S
00

















h ￿ ^ S
00
(! + ￿￿ha) and ^ S
00
‘ ￿ ^ S
00
(! + ￿￿‘a). For all (!;a) such that ￿￿ha + ! ￿ c(q￿), ^ S
00
‘ < 0 and
^ S
00
h < 0 and







So, H is negative de￿nite and any solution to (104)-(105) such that ! +￿￿ha < c(q￿) corresponds to a strict
local maximum and hence, from the concavity of the objective, it corresponds to the global maximum.
Suppose next that the solution is such that ! + ￿￿ha ￿ c(q￿). From (104)-(105),
￿‘ ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿‘a) = min
￿
i;




with ! = 0 if i >
(￿￿￿￿ ￿)
￿￿‘ and a = 0 if i <
(￿￿￿￿ ￿)





￿￿‘ then any pair (!;a) such that ! +￿￿ha ￿ c(q￿) and ￿‘ ^ S
0
(! +￿￿‘a) = i is solution to (102). For






69(ii) ￿ = ￿￿ ￿. The ￿rst-order condition for a requires ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿ha) = ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿‘a) = 0 and hence any
a ￿ [c(q￿) ￿ !]=￿￿‘ is part of a solution. But then (104) implies ! = 0.
(iii) ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ then the ￿rst-order condition for a admits no solution.
The following proposition establishes the existence of an equilibrium and the uniqueness of the price of
capital and the allocation of the PM output conditional on the realization of ￿.47 Denote q‘ and qh the
output levels in the PM when ￿ = ￿‘ and ￿ = ￿h, respectively.
Proposition 11 There exists an equilibrium and (￿;q‘;qh) is uniquely determined. If A ￿ c(q￿)=￿￿‘ then
the equilibrium is nonmonetary and ￿ = ￿￿ ￿. If A < c(q￿)=￿￿‘ then ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ and there is i0 > 0 such that for
all i < i0 an equilibrium is monetary.




a(j)dj : a(j) solution to (102)
￿
:
Second, it shows that ￿ is uniquely determined. Third, it establishes that the PM output levels, q‘ and qh,
are unique. Finally, it determines the conditions ￿at money to be valued.
(i) Existence. Consider ￿rst the case ￿ > ￿￿ ￿. As shown in the proof of Lemma 13 (Part (i)), any solution
(!;a) to (102) lies in the compact set [0;c(q￿)] ￿ [0;c(q￿)=￿￿‘]. Since the objective in (102) is continuous,
the Theorem of the Maximum guarantees that Ad(￿) is nonempty and upper-hemi continuous. Since the
objective in (102) is concave, Ad(￿) is convex-valued. From Lemma 13, Ad(￿￿ ￿) = [c(q￿)=￿￿‘;1). From
(104) and (105), it can be checked that Ad(￿) = f0g for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿h and Ad(￿) = fag where a solves
￿h￿￿h ^ S
0
(￿￿ha) + ￿‘￿￿‘ ^ S
0
(￿￿‘a) = ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
for all ￿ < ￿￿ ￿+i￿￿‘ (since ! = 0). Moreover, a ! c(q￿)=￿￿‘ as ￿ ! ￿￿ ￿. Hence, from this characterization
of Ad(￿), there is a ￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿;￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘] such that A 2 Ad(￿).
(ii) Uniqueness. In order to prove that ￿ is uniquely determined, I show that any selection from Ad is
decreasing in ￿: if a1 2 Ad(￿1) and a2 2 Ad(￿2) for ￿2 > ￿1 then a2 < a1 unless a2 = a1 = 0. Consider
47Buyers￿portfolios are not always uniquely determined. If (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿‘ = i, and provided that ^ S
0
(! + ￿￿ha) = 0, real
balances and capital are perfect substitutes. If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ then buyers hold any quantity of capital above the level that satiates
their liquidity needs in the PM, ^ S
0
= 0, and they hold no real balances.
70￿2 > ￿1, and the associated portfolio choices (!1;a1) and (!2;a2). By revealed preferences,
￿￿1a1 + ￿(!1;a1) ￿ ￿￿1a2 + ￿(!2;a2)
￿￿2a2 + ￿(!2;a2) ￿ ￿￿2a1 + ￿(!1;a1);
where ￿(!;a) ￿ ￿i! + ￿￿ ￿a + ￿h ^ S(! + ￿￿ha) + ￿‘ ^ S(! + ￿￿‘a). These last two inequalities yield
￿1(a1 ￿ a2) ￿ ￿(!1;a1) ￿ ￿(!2;a2) ￿ ￿2 (a1 ￿ a2):
Since ￿2 > ￿1 then a1 ￿ a2. Suppose a1 = a2 > 0. From (105), !2 < !1 (where I have used that ^ S
0
< 0 if
! + ￿￿a < c(q￿)). But then, from (104), !1 = 0. A contradiction.
(iii) The allocation (q‘;qh). From (i) and (ii), there exists a unique ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ such that A 2 Ad(￿). If
A ￿ c(q￿)=￿￿‘ then ￿ = ￿￿ ￿. Since a ￿ c(q￿)=￿￿‘ for all a 2 Ad(￿￿ ￿) then qh = q‘ = q￿. If A < c(q￿)=￿￿‘
then, from Lemma 13, (!;a) is uniquely determined unless (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿‘ = i and ￿‘ ^ S
0
[￿‘c(q￿)=￿h] ￿ i in






and qh = q￿. (See proof of Lemma 13.) For given (!;a) the problem
(99)-(100) determines uniquely qh and q‘.
(iv) Suppose an equilibrium is nonmonetary. Then, !(j) = 0 and a(j) is the unique solution to (105) for
all j 2 B. Hence, a(j) = A. From (104) ! = 0 requires
￿i + ￿h ^ S
0
(￿￿hA) + ￿‘ ^ S
0
(￿￿‘A) ￿ 0:
De￿ne i0 = ￿h ^ S
0
(￿￿hA) + ￿‘ ^ S
0
(￿￿‘A). By the contrapositive, if i < i0 then the equilibrium is monetary.
Provided that ￿￿‘A < c(q￿), ^ S
0
(￿￿‘A) > 0 and i0 > 0. Finally, if ￿￿‘A ￿ c(q￿) then ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ and ! = 0.
If the economy-wide capital stock is large enough to allow agents to trade q￿ in the PM for the lowest
realization of ￿ then ￿at money is not valued.48 If the aggregate capital stock is too low relative to agents￿
liquidity needs (in terms of means of payment) then the price of capital increases above its fundamental
value and ￿at money can be valued provided that i is su¢ ciently low.
The expression for the price of capital in equilibrium is obtained from (102) by taking the ￿rst order
condition for a, i.e.,













48This result is in accordance with Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) who show that money is useful in the presence of capital in
the Lagos-Wright environment if the ￿rst-best level of capital stock provides enough wealth for agents to trade in the PM, i.e.,
there is no shortage of capital to be used as means of payment.
71It has two components. The ￿rst component is its fundamental value, ￿￿ ￿. The second component is the
liquidity value of capital in the PM, the last two terms on the right-hand side of (106). This liquidity value
arises because capital can help relaxing buyers￿budget constraint in a bilateral match.
To see how monetary policy can a⁄ect asset prices, take the ￿rst-order condition of (102) with respect to














As the cost of holding ￿at money increases the marginal liquidity of wealth in the PM increases, which in
turn raises ￿.
The next proposition compares the (gross) rates of return of money and capital, Rm = ￿￿1 and Ra = ￿ ￿=￿,
respectively. Let ￿ denote the covariance between the return of capital, ￿, and the marginal return of wealth
in the PM, [u0(q)=c0(q) ￿ 1], i.e.,





















Proof. The expression for ￿ given by (106) can be rearranged as
￿ = ￿
￿



























in any monetary equi-
librium. Substitute ￿ by its expression given by (108) into (110) to get
￿ = ￿(1 + i)￿ ￿
￿
￿




Divide by ￿ ￿ and use the de￿nition ￿ = ￿(1 + i) to get (109). In order to show that Ra > Rm it is enough
to establish that ￿ < 0. Notice that ￿h (￿h ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿‘ (￿‘ ￿ ￿ ￿) = 0. From (104), and since ^ S
00
(￿￿a + !) < 0
whenever ^ S
0
(￿￿a + !) > 0, in any monetary equilibrium 0 ￿ ^ S
0
(￿￿ha + !) < ^ S
0



















72and ￿ < 0.
Capital has a higher rate of return than ￿at money in any monetary equilibrium. This result holds even
though agents are risk-neutral with respect to their AM consumption. This rate-of-return di⁄erential arises
because capital is used as a means of payment in the PM where individuals are risk-averse. Capital yields a
high dividend in matches when the marginal value of wealth in the PM is low, and a low dividend in matches
where the marginal value of wealth is high.49 In contrast, the value of money is constant and uncorrelated
with the marginal utility of wealth in the PM. Finally, as ￿h￿￿‘ ! 0 then ￿ ! 0 and Ra = ￿￿1, i.e., money
and capital have the same rate of return.
Incomplete information
I now describe succinctly the case where both buyers and sellers are uninformed about the future value of
￿. Buyers choose their portfolios in order to maximize ￿i! ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)a + ^ S(! + ￿￿ ￿a). If A < c(q￿)=￿￿ ￿
then ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ and there is i0 > 0 such that for all i < i0 an equilibrium is monetary. Moreover, if a monetary
equilibrium exists then ￿ = ￿￿ ￿(1+i) and 1+i = u0(q)=c0(q) where q is the quantity produced and consumed
in bilateral matches in the PM. In this case, Ra = Rm, i.e., ￿at money and capital have the same rate of
return.
49This result is analogous to the one in Lagos (2006) who ￿nds that even in the absence of legal restrictions on the use of
assets as means of payment his model can be consistent with an equity-premium puzzle, i.e., a too large return di⁄erential
between bonds and equity.
73F. Endogenizing sellers￿portfolio choices
This appendix considers the model in Section 6 where both the real asset and ￿at money are traded in the
AM, and it relaxes the assumption that sellers cannot produce in the AM (and hence cannot accumulate
assets.) The utility function of a seller becomes
Us
t = ￿‘t ￿ c(qt) + ￿xt+1
where ‘t 2 R+ is the disutility of e⁄ort of the seller. The production technology in the AM is linear (yt = ‘t).
I assume that both the buyer￿ s and the seller￿ s portfolios are common knowledge in a match in the PM, and
I maintain the assumption that buyers have some private information about the future value of the dividend.














s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿(q;d;￿)￿￿hd + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿￿‘d +
￿
￿




￿ ￿ !b; ￿as ￿ d ￿ ab: (113)
The novelty with respect to the model in Section 6 is the constraint (113) according to which the seller holds
some assets, which he can transfer to the buyer.
The following Lemma rules out pooling o⁄ers.
Lemma 14 In equilibrium, there is no pooling o⁄er such that d 6= 0.
Proof. Suppose ￿rst that there is a pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) such that ￿ d > 0. One can follow the proof
of Lemma 5 to show that such an equilibrium would violate the Intuitive Criterion. Suppose next that the
pooling o⁄er is such that ￿ d < 0, i.e., the seller transfers some of his real asset to the buyer. The participation
constraint of the seller implies ￿ ￿ > 0. Since ￿ d < 0 and ￿(￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) 2 (0;1) then
￿c(￿ q) + ￿(￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿)￿￿h ￿ d +
￿
1 ￿ ￿(￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿‘ ￿ d +
￿
￿




Hence, a necessary condition for the pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) to be acceptable is
￿c(￿ q) + ￿￿‘ ￿ d +
￿
￿
￿ ￿ > 0:
74I will establish that there is an unsent o⁄er (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) such that
u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿h ~ d ￿
￿
￿
~ ￿ < ￿ Sh (114)
u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿‘ ~ d ￿
￿
￿
~ ￿ > ￿ S‘ (115)
￿c(~ q) + ￿￿‘ ~ d +
￿
￿
~ ￿ ￿ 0; (116)
where ￿ Sh ￿ u(￿ q)￿￿￿h ￿ d￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ and ￿ S‘ ￿ u(￿ q)￿￿￿‘ ￿ d￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿. According to (114), the o⁄er (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) would make
a buyer in the high-dividend state worse-o⁄ relative to his equilibrium payo⁄; from (115), it would make a
buyer in the low-dividend state better o⁄; from (116), it would be accepted by sellers provided that they
believe that ￿ = ￿‘. If one can ￿nd such an o⁄er then the proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion.
Consider an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er such that ~ q = ￿ q and ~ d = ￿ d + " where " > 0. The conditions (114)
and (115) imply
￿‘ <
￿ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
"￿
< ￿h: (117)
The condition (116) requires then
￿"
￿￿

















< ￿"(￿h ￿ ￿‘):
Hence, for any " > 0 such that " ￿
h




=￿(￿h ￿ ￿‘) the inequality (118) is satis￿ed. For
any ", one can ￿nd ~ ￿ such that (117) holds. Provided that " is su¢ ciently small, the o⁄er (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) is feasible.
Consequently, the proposed equilibrium with the pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) violates the Intuitive Criterion.
From Lemma 14, the o⁄er made by a buyer in the low-dividend state must satisfy ￿c(q)+￿￿‘d+
￿
￿￿ ￿ 0.
Hence, the buyer￿ s payo⁄ in the low-dividend state is bounded above by his complete information payo⁄.
















￿ ￿ !b; ￿as ￿ d ￿ ab:
75The solution is q‘ = q￿ and ￿￿‘d‘ +
￿
￿￿‘ = c(q￿) if ￿￿‘ab + !b ￿ c(q￿). Otherwise,
￿
￿￿‘ = !b, d‘ = ab
and c(q‘) = ￿￿‘ab + !b. Hence, there is always a complete-information o⁄er such that d‘ ￿ 0. Since
￿(q;d;￿)￿￿hd + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿￿‘d ￿ ￿￿‘d for all d ￿ 0, the complete information o⁄er is acceptable for
any belief system.
Consider next the o⁄er made by a buyer in the high-dividend state. From Lemma 14, it satis￿es ￿c(q)+
￿￿hd+
￿
￿￿ ￿ 0. If !b ￿ c(q￿) then the buyer can achieve his complete-information payo⁄by o⁄ering qh = q￿,
dh = 0 and
￿
￿￿h = c(q￿). Provided that !b < c(q￿), the buyer cannot make the complete information o⁄er
since otherwise it would be imitated by a buyer in the low-dividend state. In this case, the buyer makes
an o⁄er that maximizes his payo⁄ but that does not provide a buyer in the low-dividend state with strict













u(q) ￿ ￿￿‘d ￿
￿
￿




￿ ￿ !b; ￿as ￿ d ￿ ab:
The solution to this problem is similar to the one described in Lemma 6. The incentive-compatibility
constraint cannot be slack since otherwise (qh;dh;￿h) would coincide with the complete information o⁄er.
Suppose that the seller￿ s participation constraint is slack. Then, the incentive-compatibility constraint is
binding which implies
u(qh) ￿ ￿￿hdh ￿
￿
￿
￿h = ￿ S‘ ￿ (￿h ￿ ￿‘)￿dh;
and hence
￿ Sh = ￿ max
￿as￿d￿ab (￿‘ ￿ ￿h)d + ￿ S‘ = ￿ (￿h ￿ ￿‘)as + ￿ S‘:
The buyer asks for the whole stock of real assets held by the seller. Using the fact that dh = ￿as, the highest
achievable payo⁄ for the buyer is
￿ Sh = max
q;d;￿
[u(q) ￿ z]
s.t. ￿ c(q) + z ￿ 0
￿!s ￿ ￿￿has ￿ z ￿ !b ￿ ￿￿has:
76Provided that !b < c(q￿) and ab > 0, it can be checked that ￿ S‘ > ￿ Sh which is a contradiction. So, the
seller￿ s participation constraint is binding.
Since sellers get no surplus in the PM trades, their problem in the AM is
max
!;a f￿i! ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)ag:
They accumulate no real balances (!s = 0), and they hold the real asset (as > 0) only if ￿ = ￿￿ ￿. Sellers
hold an asset only if it is priced at its fundamental value.
77G. Endogenous capital stock
The model of Section 6 can be readily extended to endogenize the quantity of real assets in the economy. I
lay down succinctly such an extension. The approach is similar to the one in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006).
Suppose that buyers can produce capital goods in the ￿rst period of their lives. The disutility cost to
produce a units of capital is  (a) with  (0) = 0,  
0 > 0 and  
00 > 0. Capital goods are one-period lived,
and they generate ￿ 2 f￿‘;￿hg units of AM-goods in the subsequent period.




￿i! ￿  (a) + ￿hSh(!;a) + ￿‘S‘(!;a) + ￿￿ ￿a
￿
:
The determination of the terms of trade in the PM is characterized by Lemmas 5 and 6. Following the
proof of Lemma 7, it can be shown that there is a unique solution (!;a) to the buyer￿ s problem, and hence
equilibrium is unique.
Let a￿ denote the socially e¢ cient level of capital, i.e., the solution to  
0(a) = ￿￿ ￿. If a￿ ￿ c(q￿)=￿￿‘ then
a = a￿ and q‘ = q￿. Buyers have enough wealth to buy the ￿rst best quantity of output in the low-dividend









where qh is solution to (48)-(49) with ! = 0. So, in contrast to Lagos and Rocheteau (2006), there exists a
monetary equilibrium for any level of a￿.
If a￿ < c(q￿)=￿￿‘ then there exists a threshold ~ { de￿ned as
~ { = ￿hSh
! (c(q￿) ￿ ￿￿‘a￿;a￿)
such that if i > ~ { then a > a￿. Buyers overaccumulate capital because of the liquidity services it provides
in the PM. Denote ^ a the solution to  
0(a) = ￿hSh
a(0;a) + ￿‘S‘
a(0;a) + ￿￿ ￿. A monetary equilibrium exists
provided that i < i0(^ a) where
i0(^ a) = ￿hSh
!(0;^ a) + ￿‘S‘
!(0;^ a)
Following a similar argument as in Proposition 6, it can be shown that if a￿ < c(q￿)=￿￿‘ and i 2 (~ {;i0(^ a))
then da=di > 0. An increase in in￿ ation induces buyers to accumulate more capital.
78Finally, the rate of return of capital is Ra = ￿ ￿= 
0(a). Following the proof of Proposition 7, it can be
shown that in any monetary equilibrium Ra > Rm, capital dominates ￿at money in its rate of return.
In contrast, in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006), ￿at money and capital have the same rate of return in any
monetary equilibrium. Moreover, if i < ~ { then  
0(a) = ￿￿ ￿ so that Ra = ￿
￿1, the rate of return of capital is
equal to the gross discount rate.
79